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THE PROMISE AND FAILURE OF SILENCE AS 
A SHIELD AGAINST IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT 
Linus Chan⃰ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1989 an Immigration Judge ruled that a respondent in deportation 
proceedings, a man by the name of Mr. Guevara, was not a United States 
citizen and therefore could be deported from the United States.1  Ruling 
that a person was not a United States citizen was a prerequisite under both 
federal regulations and Supreme Court precedent in order for deportation 
to occur, but unlike most deportation cases, this case involved what type 
of evidence could be used to prove alienage.2  What made this case 
interesting was that the Immigration Judge made his finding of alienage 
based solely on Mr. Guevara’s silence.3  When called to testify at his 
deportation proceeding, Mr. Guevara refused to answer any questions 
regarding where he was from, his citizenship status, or his nationality.4  
He informed the court of his intent to remain silent—despite a general 
order granting immunity from criminal prosecution.5  The Immigration 
Judge ruled that with the immunity in place and the nature of the 
proceedings being civil, he was going to make an adverse inference and 
find Mr. Guevara an alien subject to deportation.6  According to the 
Immigration Judge, silence was enough for the government to prove that 
Mr. Guevara was not a U.S. citizen; not satisfied with this result, Mr. 
Guevara filed an interlocutory appeal to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA).7  The BIA assumed the grant of immunity valid and agreed 
that adverse inferences were allowed, but remarkably ruled that silence 
                                                
* R. Linus Chan is an Associate Professor of Clinical Law at the University of Minnesota. 
1 See Matter of Guevara, 20 I. &W. Dec. 238, 239 (BIA 1991) (terminating the deportation 
proceedings because the previous finding in support of alienage and deportability was 
erroneous). 
2 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2012) (“The Service has the burden of establishing by clear 
and convincing evidence that, in the case of an alien who has been admitted to the United 
States, the alien is deportable.”) (citations omitted). 
3 See Guevara, 20 I. & W. Dec. at 240 (finding that Mr. Guevara’s silence coupled with the 
offer of immunity was enough to infer that Mr. Guevara was an alien). 
4 See id. at 239 (describing Mr. Guevara’s refusal to answer questions in court relating to 
his place of birth, citizenship, or alleged alienage). 
5 See id. at 239–40 (indicating that the judge offered Mr. Guevara immunity in response 
to his silence and invocation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, which 
Mr. Guevara refused to accept). 
6 See id. at 240 (deciding that Mr. Guevara’s silence, in the context of the offer of 
immunity, implied that Mr. Guevara was an alien). 
7 See id. at 239 (explaining that Mr. Guevara’s appeal was interlocutory in nature). 
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cannot on its own stand as evidence of alienage.8  Noting that the burden 
of proof was on the Service, the BIA wrote, “If the only evidence necessary 
to satisfy this burden [was] the silence of the other party, then for all 
practical purposes, the burden would actually fall upon the silent party 
from the outset.”9  The BIA terminated Mr. Guevara’s deportation 
proceedings because of his passive silence.10   
If silence alone cannot prove alienage, could silence threaten the entire 
removal process, or at least insulate undocumented migrants without any 
prior immigration record from removal?  What if non-citizens vulnerable 
to deportation followed the advice of legal advocacy groups11 and 
maintained silence in the face of questions of one’s alienage?  Would that 
slow down the deportation regime?  The BIA indicated that other evidence 
would be needed other than silence to prove alienage, but does not 
indicate what that evidence would be.12  Alienage is a tricky thing to 
prove, as it is often best defined13 as a lack of U.S. citizenship, and proving 
a negative can be difficult.14  Historically, putting the government to the 
task of disproving one’s claim to citizenship has allowed people to avoid 
                                                
8 See id. at 241–42 (holding that Mr. Guevara’s silence, with the absence of any other 
evidence, was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of alienage). 
9 Guevara, 20 I. & W. Dec. at 244 (alteration in original). 
10 See id. at 245 (finding that deportability was insufficiently established and therefore 
terminating the deportation proceedings). 
11 See, e.g., Your Rights When You Are Approached by the Police: Fact Sheet for Workers, NELP 
(2003) http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/Fact-sheet-formatted.pdf 
[perma.cc/QAA8-PYL6] (providing general advice for workers regarding what to do if they 
are approached by the police on the street, and asked for their immigration status, or asked 
to show their green card); Know Your Rights:  Stopped by Police, Immigration Agents, or FBI, 
ACLU (2016) https://www.aclu.org/files/kyr/MKG17-KYR-PoliceImmigrationFBI-One 
Pager-English-v01.pdf [perma.cc/CC3Z-5SGQ] (describing what to do if pulled over by 
police, if the police come to the home, or if asked about immigration status); Assemblyman 
Nick Perry, Know Your Rights! What to Do if Stopped by Police, FBI or ICE, NY ASSEMBLY, 
http://nyassembly.gov/member_files/058/20101216/ [perma.cc/3G3Z-YP2J] (presenting 
information on what to do if stopped by police, questioned about immigration status, or 
detained by ICE). 
12 See Guevara, 20 I. & W. Dec. at 242 (stating that the absence of any evidence other than 
Mr. Guevara’s silence does not sufficiently prove alienage). 
13  Cf. Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 EMORY L.J. 1411, 1417 
(1997) (explaining that the acceptance of dual citizenship means that, while a person may be 
a citizen of another country, they are not precluded from becoming a U.S. citizen at the same 
time). 
14 See EXECUTIVE OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., The Shifting Burdens of Immigr. L., IMMIGRATION 
LAW ADVISOR (2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/11/ 
05/vol8no8_edit3.pdf [perma.cc/V25K-K5YY] (indicating that the burden is on the state to 
show clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence of alienage). 
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obstacles and barriers to migration; however, the question remains would 
it also be effective in preventing deportation in modern society?15   
Uncertainty over citizenship can act as a legal and constitutional 
shield from deportation and criminal migration convictions because U.S. 
citizens enjoy immunity both from deportation and migration crimes.16  
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) requires a finding that the 
person is not a U.S. citizen as a prerequisite for removal.17  In addition to 
statutory bars, there are strong constitutional principles that prevent exile 
or banishment from the United States for a citizen.18  As Justice Warren 
wrote in Trop v. Dulles,19 “[banishment] is a form of punishment more 
primitive than torture” and “[banishment is] a fate universally decried by 
civilized people.”20  Freedom from the possibility of deportation may be 
one of the only Constitutional rights given exclusively to citizens.21  Unlike 
                                                
15   Cf. Estelle T. Lau, Excavating the "Chinese Wall":  Towards A Socio-Historical Perspective on 
the Development of United States Immigration Administration and Chinese, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1068, 
1076–77, n.14 (1998) (giving a clear example of how difficult it is to disprove citizenship 
claims).  The San Francisco fire of 1906, where the practice of “paper sons” arose, allowing 
Chinese residents to claim citizenship as birth records were destroyed in the fires and 
allowing them to avoid deportation and bring new migrants over to bypass the ban on 
Chinese migration.  Id.  See also Angel Island Immigrant Journeys: Teacher Background, ANGEL 
ISLAND IMMIGR. STATION FOUND., https://www.aiisf.org/pdf/Curriculum_Guide_ 
Historical_Background.pdf [perma.cc/4XFF-BFXC] (“The applicant had the right to appeal, 
however and only 2% of those who appealed their cases were actually deported. 
Nevertheless, some were incarcerated at Angel Island for as long as two years while their 
appeals dragged on.  Happily, most applicants were able to pass the interrogation, and 90% 
of incoming Chinese landed successfully”).  It was the common law right of derivative 
citizenship that allowed paper sons to claim citizenship in a country in which they were 
never born in.  Id.  See also JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 
1608–1870 (1978) (discussing generally citizenship and alienage and their development 
within the American system). 
16  See Allan Wernick, Naturalized U.S. citizens can’t be deported, even if they commit crimes, 
NEW YORK DAILY TIMES (2016), http://www.nydailynews.com/naturalized-citizens-
deported-crimes-article-1.2643570 [perma.cc/LM9B-JBQS] (explaining that naturalized 
citizens cannot be deported for criminal activity after they have been naturalized). 
17 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2) (2012) (outlining out the procedure for removal proceedings, 
requiring a finding that the person facing removal is not a U.S. citizen). 
18 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (addressing banishment of a natural born citizen 
in the context of denaturalization). 
19  See id. (reasoning that the United States government failed to prove the plaintiff’s 
service in the Japanese army was voluntary). 
20 See id. at 101–02. 
21 See Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 
§ 1 (“[A]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”). 
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other forms of relief from deportation, such as asylum22 or cancellation,23 
which are normally the burden of the person in removal to prove,24 
proving that a person lacks U.S. citizenship is the burden of the U.S. 
government and requires “clear and convincing” evidence.25  Similarly, 
the U.S. criminal code does not allow U.S. citizens to be punished for 
illegal entry or re-entry into the United States as only “aliens” are subject 
to prosecution.26  Thus, because alienage is an element of the criminal 
statute, not only does the government have the burden to prove someone 
is not a U.S. citizen, but it must also do so beyond a reasonable doubt in 
order to secure a criminal conviction.27   
Despite these burdens, the U.S. government continues to be able to 
deport a large number of people.28  In Fiscal Year (FY) 2014, the U.S. 
government deported approximately 400,000 people and prosecuted 
about 50,000 people for illegal entry or re-entry.29  Many who end up as 
targets for removal have already provided more than enough evidence to 
immigration officials regarding their alienage, for example, visa 
applicants are required to state their citizenship and place of birth.30  
Similarly, nearly anyone who has applied for an immigration benefit, such 
as work authorization or petitioning for a relative, would have 
volunteered information regarding their citizenship and place of birth.31  
                                                
22 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012) (describing the authority and conditions for granting asylum 
to aliens who are refugees from another country). 
23 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2012) (outlining the process for cancellation of removal 
proceedings). 
24 See 8 U.S.C. § 1299a(c)(4)(A) (2012) (“An Alien applying for relief or protection from 
removal has the burden of proof.”). 
25 See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966) (holding that in removal proceedings the 
government must establish the facts supporting deportability by clear, unequivocal, and 
convincing evidence). 
26 See 8 U.S.C § 1326 (defining reentry of removed aliens).  See also United States v. 
Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (stating that the offense of illegal 
reentry is a specific intent crime as opposed to a general intent crime). 
27 See 8 U.S.C § 1326 (2012) (establishing that a prerequisite for a removed alien to be 
eligible for reentry into the United States is that the defendant was, in fact, an alien). 
28 See FY 2016 ICE Immigration Removals, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ICE, 
https://www.ice.gov/removal-statistics/2016 [https://perma.cc/MDR6-9MK2]; Overview 
of Federal Criminal Cases Fiscal Year 2015, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, (June 2016), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-
publications/2016/FY15_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf [perma.cc/P8JS-VWSA] 
(depicting the removal statistics as trending downward, despite there still being over 200,000 
removals each year). 
29 See id. at 2.  But see Overview of Federal Criminal Cases Fiscal Year 2015, supra note 28 
(giving a general overview of criminal immigration cases in the fiscal year 2015). 
30 See 8 U.S.C. § 1202 (2012) (governing the visa application process). 
31 See id. (mandating that applying for a visa requires the applicant to provide information 
such as their full name, place of birth, age, sex, and citizenship). 
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This information is increasingly gathered into databases and tied into 
individual’s biometrics—meaning that for many, the United States can 
document at least some information indicating someone’s alienage.32   
Yet, there is a specific population where proof of alienage is not likely 
to exist in any database or in the possession of the United States 
government.33  In FY 2016, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
sought to remove close to 133,000 people from the United States based on 
entering the United States without admission or inspection.34  In FY 2016, 
this specific charge led all charges in removal proceedings and consisted 
of 43.5% of the total number of charges.35  This group is more commonly 
considered as “border crossers.”36  What’s often overlooked about this 
population is not only how they are targeted for removal by Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) or Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), but 
also how the government meets its burden to prove that they are not U.S. 
citizens—especially for those removed from the interior of the United 
States.37  Proof of alienage usually is obtained by asking two questions:  (1) 
Where were you born? and (2) Are you a citizen of the United States?38  
                                                
32 See Biometrics: Frequently Asked Questions, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION 
https://www.eff.org/sls/tech/biometrics/faq [perma.cc/GTP2-XM8V] (describing how 
the government uses biometric data to identify and track people).  This is not to say that such 
information is always accurate.  One of the complaints about the use of some databases is 
how they often missed when a person may have naturalized, and could easily miss when 
someone acquires citizenship based on their parents.  Nonetheless, there is some evidence of 
alienage usually. 
33 See Immigration Court Post-Trump Cases:  Latest Data, TRAC IMMIGR. (Mar. 21, 2017), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/462/ [perma.cc/S5S7-SYVS] (depicting the 
statistics on the number of immigrants who come into the United States without admission 
or inspection, and therefore do not have any proof of alienage). 
34 See id. (stating that 133,044 people were removed from the United States based on them 
entering without admission or parole). 
35 See id. (indicating that 43.5 percent of removal proceedings were based upon the aliens’ 
entry without inspection).  It is important to note that “total charges” is not synonymous 
with people as any one person can face multiple charges for removal, however, the same 
charge is not repeated.  Id.  Therefore, we know that at least 133,000 people that DHS began 
removal proceedings against were accused of entering the United States without permission.  
Id. 
36 See, e.g., Associated Press, Barely Half of Illegal Border Crossers from Mexico Caught, LOS 
ANGELES TIMES (2016) http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-border-cross-
20161006-snap-story.html [perma.cc/H4ZP-4ZP9] (referring to the aliens who illegally cross 
the border between Mexico and the United States as “border crossers”). 
37 See EXECUTIVE OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., The Shifting Burdens of Immigration Law, supra note 
14 (indicating that the burden for alienage is on the state to show clear, unequivocal, and 
convincing evidence of alienage).  There may be an argument that observing one crossing 
the border really does not answer the question of whether they are a U.S. citizen or not, but 
there may be an inference that a U.S. citizen would not need to do so—even though many 
actually have for a variety of reasons.  Id. 
38 See id. (reiterating the burden of proof for alienage). 
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Remarkably, people answer these questions, often regardless of context.39  
From questioning by ICE or CBP officers directly, booking questions after 
arrest, or filling out forms at court hearings, people share their citizenship 
status and place of birth all too easily and often without hesitation.40  If so 
much hinges on one’s immigration status or lack of citizenship, why do 
people under investigation volunteer their alienage so readily?  Wouldn’t 
a simple solution be for people to remain silent?  The ACLU and other 
legal rights groups have consistently urged people facing deportation to 
be silent, with the sole exception of providing a name, and yet this advice 
has not appeared to slow down the rate of deportations.41 
It is a federal crime to claim false U.S. citizenship and to lie to federal 
officers,42 thus, those targeted for deportation could not legally lie about 
his or her citizenship status.43  Nonetheless, a simple route to protection 
may be silence.  Evidence of one’s citizenship is not readily attainable in 
the form of tangible evidence.44  While many citizens may carry with them 
some form of identification such as a driver’s license, these forms of 
identification are poor proxies for citizenship.45  There is no legal 
requirement to carry identification and there does not exist a national 
identification card designed to prove citizenship.46  People rarely carry 
                                                
39 Cf. Mike Davis, Know Your Rights if ICE Agents Stop You, USA TODAY (Mar. 23, 2017), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/03/23/immigration-citizens-
know-your-rights/99534722/ [perma.cc/S793-CSA3] (establishing that individuals readily 
reveal information about their citizenship, identity, and place of birth too easily when 
questioned by authorities). 
40 Id. 
41 See supra text accompanying note 11 (explaining that remaining silent is a solution that 
is often unused despite the fact individuals are told to remain silent, however, this does not 
seem to have slowed deportation rate). 
42 See 18 U.S.C. § 911 (2012) (providing that those who are not citizens of the United States 
may not willfully present themselves as citizens of the United States without penalty).  See 
also id. § 1001 (laying forth the penalties for the United States government if it partakes in 
falsifying information). 
43 See id. § 911 (mandating that it is a crime to identify oneself as a United States citizen if 
that is not the individual’s actual legal status). 
44 See Your Social Security Number and Card, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (Jan. 2017), 
https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10002.pdf [perma.cc/RS9Q-PAUV] (providing 
examples of the documentation that provides citizenship information, and that without great 
difficulty would be presented to prove citizenship). 
45 See 12 States (and DC) That Allow Driver's Licenses for People in the Country Illegally, 
PROCON (Mar. 18, 2016), https://immigration.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID= 
005535 [perma.cc/XY27-TXD6] (providing that some states allow undocumented 
individuals to obtain driver’s licenses while others make it extremely difficult to get a 
driver’s license without proof of citizenship or lawful residence; it is a patchwork system 
that has an inconsistent application throughout the United States). 
46 See U.S. Passports & Int’l Travel, Passport Statistics, U.S. DEP’T OF ST., 
https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/passports/statistics.html [perma.cc/4C8Y-
BUEJ] (reporting that there are only 113 million valid passports in circulation while there are 
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around their passport and almost never carry around proof of their place 
of birth (i.e. birth certificate).  Without self-admission or cooperation by 
those targeted for removal, it would be extremely time-consuming and 
nearly impossible for immigration agents to investigate and prove that a 
person is not a U.S. citizen.47  So why don’t more people use the shield of 
silence for protection?  Criminal prosecutions have skyrocketed for 
migration crimes.48  Since alienage is an element for prosecuting those 
crimes, giving up one’s nationality, birthplace, or citizenship is 
incriminating and provides a “chain of evidence” that could lead to 
criminal prosecution.49  Under these circumstances, it’s natural to turn to 
the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause for protection.50   
While theoretically the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause 
could be a lawful and constitutional barrier against immigration 
enforcement, there are two main reasons why so few people seek its 
protection.51  First, the right against self-incrimination is at its weakest 
when it matters the most for non-citizens encountering law enforcement.52  
The right to silence is at its strongest during a criminal trial, but at its 
weakest during the type of interactions that are crucial for migrants 
vulnerable to deportation.53  Legal doctrines such as express invocation, 
the booking exception of Miranda, and the use of an objective, race-neutral 
version of coercion weakens the practical effectiveness of silence in the 
face of questioning.54  Second, because citizenship and immigration status 
have become cultural markers of identity, rather than facts that deserve 
privacy, the burden and cost of invoking silence sits solely with the 
                                                
an estimated 300 million citizens).  However, lacking a passport does not mean much in 
regard to citizenship status.  Id. 
47 See Liliana Caracoza, What to Do if You Are Stopped by Immigration Officers, SEATTLE 
GLOBALIST (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.seattleglobalist.com/2013/03/18/what-to-do-if-
stopped-by-ice/11305 [perma.cc/3UAA-U6EN] (providing an account of an individual who 
was interrogated by ICE).  Imagine officers forced to try and interview known associates, 
attempt to contact people, locate previously filed paperwork, or conduct wide ranging 
investigations—all without sufficient probable cause or information to justify the use of 
warrants or subpoenas. 
48 See FY 2016 ICE Immigration Removals, ICE (2016), https://www.ice.gov/removal-
statistics/2016 [perma.cc/R86V-J782] (presenting data on immigrant deportation which is a 
result of successful migration prosecutions). 
49 See Immigration Law Adviser, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/ 
sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/11/05/vol8no8_edit3.pdf [perma.cc/U7EK-SNME] 
(providing information about alienage and its entwined nature with deportation in the 
United States criminal system). 
50 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be 
a witness against himself.”). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
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migrant.55  The only way in which silence can become an effective 
protection against deportation is if those U.S. citizens who are immune 
from deportation and migration crimes also feel the need to protect 
information about their citizenship status.56  Part II of the Article delves 
into the various phases of interactions between migrants and law 
enforcement and illustrates how at each stage silence falls short of 
protecting against removal or prosecution.57  Part III of the Article explains 
why citizenship as identity and its ubiquitous and public uses has eroded 
the private nature of citizenship making it that much easier to identify and 
target those without citizenship.58 
II.  THE LIMITATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO SILENCE 
The right to silence is a uniquely American right that has been 
described as necessary to protect against an “accusatorial system.”59  The 
phrase “right to remain silent” has become engrained not only in the 
American legal system, but also in American culture, as anyone who has 
seen  U.S. police procedure on television can attest to.60  Despite its cultural 
and even iconic status, it is not without its critics.61  Scholars and jurists 
criticized the right and its application as unduly interfering with law 
enforcement and designed to protect the guilty rather than the innocent.62  
The Constitutional mooring of the right to silence, the Fifth Amendment’s 
                                                
55 See infra Part III (explaining how citizenship becoming a part of identity has 
deteriorated the private nature of citizenship). 
56 Kate Morrisey, San Diego Teacher Refuses to Answer Border Patrol Questions at Checkpoint, 
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (July 24, 2017), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/ 
news/immigration/sd-me-teacher-checkpoint-20170724-story.html [perma.cc/PT5R-LV59] 
(fostering the ability of silence to serve as protection for those being questioned by border 
patrol agents and other governmental agents seeking information about citizenship and 
alienage they do not have legal rights to obtain can only work when the silence serves as a 
standard for both citizens and non-citizens). 
57 See infra Part II (delving into the various phases of interactions between migrants and 
law enforcement when dealing with migration issues and the legal system). 
58 See infra Part III (explaining why citizenship as identity has eroded the private nature 
of citizenship in matters of individuals dealing with government entities and agents). 
59 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000) (describing the origins of the 
right to remain silence, its roots in common law, and the necessity of the right as observed 
in the law and society). 
60 See The Constitutional Right to Silence, JUSTIA (2017), https://www.justia.com/criminal/ 
procedure/miranda-rights/right-to-silence/ [perma.cc/AYL5-FDS8] (extrapolating that the 
phrase right to remain silent is a commonly used phrase in the United States but is not well 
understood by the county’s citizens). 
61 See supra Part II (presenting critical responses to the right to remain silent in regards to 
those dealing with law enforcement and the legal system). 
62 See Stephanos Bibas, The Right to Remain Silent Helps Only the Guilty, 88 IOWA L. REV. 
421, 428–29 (2003) (examining the real-world application of the right to remain silent in terms 
of individuals interacting with governmental authorities). 
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right against self-incrimination, has been questioned by jurists and 
scholars alike.63 Considerable uncertainty exists among jurists and 
scholars about whether being silent is a Constitutional right, or merely a 
prophylactic right created by the Supreme Court to protect against the use 
of coercive or involuntary statements when it created the rule in Miranda 
v. Arizona.64  Despite its long history and copious litigation around the 
right to silence, there is significant confusion on how the right to silence 
operates, especially in different situations.65  One reason for its confusion 
is that it may actually be a bundle of different rights—a right from having 
to testify, a right from having adverse consequences arise from one’s 
silence, and even the right to stop questioning from police or law 
enforcement.66  The bundle of rights are applied differently depending on 
the stage of a criminal investigation.67  Staying silent when asked 
questions will have different consequences if asked by a police officer in a 
jail cell, during a traffic stop, or if asked by a prosecutor while on a witness 
stand.68  The different consequences and applications of silence must be 
explored when deciding how effective it can be to protect against 
deportation.69 
Examining different cases and scenarios where the right to remain 
silent played a role in interactions between the police and non-citizens can 
help illustrate how and why the right to remain silent has not been an 
                                                
63 See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective:  The Right to Remain 
Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2625 (1996) (arguing that the self-incrimination clause was not 
concerned about silence, but rather testifying under an oath).  See also Akhil Amar & Renee 
B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles:  The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 
857–58 (1995) (discussing the issues of the right to remain silent in regards to self-
incrimination and the United States government); Mathew Iverson, Whether the Right to 
Silence Went Wrong, 86 MASS. L. REV. 105, 105–06 (2012) (expanding on the true implications 
of the right to remain silent and examining the right’s affects and application). 
64 See 382 U.S. 436, 436 (1966) (establishing the current rules for the right to remain silent 
and what constitutes a person being sufficiently informed of their right to remain silent while 
engaging with law enforcement). 
65 See supra Part II (discussing why the right to remain silent is such a confusing and 
complicated subject for people, their rights, and engaging with law enforcement). 
66 See The Constitutional Right to Silence, supra note 60 (laying forth the rights that are 
included in the right to silence by law in the United States across the board). 
67 See supra Part II (examining the different stages of the criminal process and the matter 
in which the privileges included in the right to remain silent are employed and the 
consequences inherent in the different applications of those privileges). 
68 See supra Part II (discussing the different situations in which individuals engage with 
law enforcement and the consequences that result in those different situations when the 
individual attempts to utilize the right to remain silent). 
69 See supra Part II (exploring the different consequences and applications of silence as 
they apply to individuals using their right to remain silent when dealing with law 
enforcement and the legal system). 
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effective tool against deportation.70  This Part will examine three different 
judicial decisions that represent three different stages of the investigative 
process:  the consensual encounter with police or law enforcement, an 
encounter after a lawful detention (but pre-arrest), and finally questioning 
post-arrest.71  An examination of these examples will illustrate several key 
aspects of the modern “right to silence” that limit its effectiveness in 
protecting non-citizens from deportation.72  First, the race-neutral and 
often “reasonable person” standard used to judge consensual encounters 
are divorced from the realities of interactions by minority populations, 
and these standards place a pragmatic barrier against people’s ability to 
invoke silence.73  Second, the right to silence’s explicit tie-in with the 
warnings required under Miranda v. Arizona presents several limitations, 
especially in the form of the booking exception, that makes it difficult for 
non-citizens to stay silent about alienage when interacting with law 
enforcement.74  Third, the right to silence’s clear invocation requirement, 
especially when applied to people who are often unversed in the legal 
system or who may have language barriers, is pragmatically 
unavailable.75  Finally, the Supreme Court’s decision interpreting the right 
against self-incrimination as a trial right76—one that cannot be violated 
until statements are introduced at trial—makes it possible for law 
enforcement to retaliate against those who remain silent on alienage.77 
                                                
70 See supra Part II (examining different judicial decisions that represent three different 
stages in the investigation process). 
71 See supra Part II (providing three different judicial decisions representing three different 
stages in the investigation process when dealing with migrant and citizenship issues). 
72 See supra Part II (examining aspects of the modern right to silence and the limits on its 
effectiveness, this is examined here in the specific context of non-citizens and migrant 
individuals dealing with the government and its agents). 
73 See infra Part II.A (delving into the reasonable person standard and its validity when 
used to asses an individual’s actions in regards to law enforcement). 
74 See infra Part II.C (explaining the booking exception and its implications in regards to 
individuals, law enforcement, and the right to remain silent). 
75 See infra Part II.B (discussing the invocation requirement as applied to individuals who 
are dealing with law enforcement, making clear that a language barrier can serve as a major 
issue when using the right to remain silent, because one must communicate that fact to law 
enforcement). 
76 See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 776 (2003) (holding that a sergeant’s questioning 
of a suspect did not violate the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, absent the 
use of the statements in a criminal case against the suspect). 
77 See id. at 764 (condoning the shooting and subsequent coercive interrogation of 
Martinez while he lay bleeding out in the hospital, merely because his statements were never 
used against him in a criminal trial). 
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A. INS v. Delgado 
How would people view federal agents in a workplace systematically 
asking everyone in that workplace if they were a U.S. citizen?78  Would 
the questioning itself need some form of probable cause, and was there a 
“seizure”79 of the entire workplace if agents were stationed at the exits?80  
These were the questions answered by the Supreme Court in 1984.81  In 
INS v. Delgado,82 the then INS agents conducted “factory surveys” in 
search of undocumented workers in three different factories.83  The agents 
would enter the factory with a warrant, set agents at the exits, and then go 
about to question the different employees.84  Work did not stop during 
these “surveys” and factory workers were allowed to move about doing 
their job duties.85  The Court described the “surveys” thusly: 
Moving systematically through the factory, the agents 
approached employees and, after identifying themselves, 
asked them from one to three questions relating to their 
citizenship. If the employee gave a credible reply that he 
was a United States citizen, the questioning ended, and 
the agent moved on to another employee. If the employee 
gave an unsatisfactory answer response or admitted that 
he was an alien, the employee was asked to produce his 
immigration papers.86 
The Ninth Circuit below had ruled that because the agents did not have 
individual probable cause to believe any specific worker was 
                                                
78 See, e.g., Latinos Talk Health, Discrimination, Immigration in New Poll, NBC NEWS (Mar. 24, 
2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/poll-lations-talk-health-discrimination-
immigration-n329211 [https://perma.cc/2NC6-F74E] (discussing how even Latinos who 
were either citizens or legal resident aliens feared and avoided talking to police out of a 
desire to not have their citizenship questioned). 
79 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
80 See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 212 (1984) (examining whether the placement of agents 
at the exits of a factory while other agents questioned the factory workers constituted a 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment). 
81 See id. at 218–19 (holding that the mere placement of agents at the exits did not constitute 
a “seizure” of the entire workplace). 
82 See id. at 212 (reversing the Court of Appeals’ decision). 
83 See id. (asserting the three factories that were surveyed). 
84 See id. (describing how the surveys were initiated). 
85 See id. at 213 (explaining that the employees were not inhibited from continuing their 
normal routine). 
86 Delgado, 466 U.S. at 212–13. 
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undocumented, the questioning violated the Fourth Amendment as an 
improper seizure.87  The Supreme Court disagreed.88 
According to the Delgado Court, the issue turned on whether the 
encounters within the factory were consensual or not.89  Was the entire 
workforce seized when the INS agents entered the factory and stationed 
agents at the exit?90  Delgado, along with cases such as United States v. 
Mendenhall91 and Florida v. Bostick, 92 developed the Court’s line of 
jurisprudence on the “freedom to leave” analysis of consensual 
encounters.93  Essentially, because consensual encounters are not 
“seizures” as contemplated by the Fourth Amendment, if a reasonable 
person felt free to leave or end a police interaction, then no violation of the 
Fourth Amendment could occur.94  The Delgado Court’s use of the 
reasonable person test to decide whether an encounter was consensual has 
received similar critiques to the Court’s decision in Florida v. Bostick.95  
                                                
87 See id. at 214 (holding that a mere general knowledge that there were undocumented 
workers working at the factory was inadequate to create probable cause and satisfy the 
Fourth Amendment). 
88 See id. at 219 (disagreeing with the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the agents’ questioning 
violated the Fourth Amendment). 
89 See id. at 215 (discussing how a consensual encounter can turn into a seizure “if, in view 
of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed 
that he was not free to leave.” (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980)). 
90 See id. at 217–18 (highlighting the differences between the reasoning of the Court of 
Appeals and the Supreme Court). 
91 446 U.S. 544, 547 (1980) (considering whether DEA agents’ search and seizure of heroin 
from an alleged dealer violated her Fourth Amendment rights). 
92 501 U.S. 429, 431 (1991) (evaluating whether a police encounter on a bus where police 
officers requested consent to search a passenger’s bags violated the passenger’s Fourth 
Amendment rights). 
93 See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 220–21 (holding that INS agents’ questioning of factory workers 
were classic consensual encounters and not seizures under the Fourth Amendment because 
the manner of questioning did not result in a reasonable fear that workers were not free to 
leave or continue working); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (reiterating that the distinction 
between consensual encounter and seizure is whether a reasonable person would have 
believed that he was free to leave); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439–40 (maintaining that whether an 
encounter amounts to a seizure is based on whether the officers’ conduct would cause a 
reasonable person to believe that they were not free to leave or decline the officers’ requests). 
94 See, e.g., Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215–16 (explaining that there cannot be a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment unless the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating that a 
reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave). 
95 See I. Bennett Capers, On Justitia, Race, Gender, and Blindness, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 203, 
218 (2006) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s determination that a reasonable person would 
have felt free to leave as ignoring important factors, including the race of the suspects and 
the fact that they were being questioned by armed authorities positioned between the 
suspects and any potential exits); Davon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented 
Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1545, 1553–63 (2011) (chastising the Supreme Court’s 
use of the reasonable person test as completely ignoring racial factors such as implicit 
stereotypes and the feeling of vulnerability that a minority person might perceive when 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 2 [2018], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol52/iss2/3
2018] The Promise and Failure of Silence 301 
Because a “reasonable person” test attempts to be race-neutral it inevitably 
underplays and overlooks racial dynamics that transform an encounter 
where a white person may feel free to risk confrontation or displeasure 
with a police officer, while a person of color would not.96  Despite explicit 
mentioning of racial dynamics in the briefs of both Delgado and Bostick, the 
Court ignored the invitation and instead analyzed the situation without 
reference to race at all.97  The Court’s analysis focused on the freedom of 
movement within the workplace and rested on the premise that actual 
detention or seizure was not occurring—just questioning.98  As the Court 
put it, “[t]he mere possibility that they would be questioned if they sought 
to leave the buildings should not have resulted in any reasonable 
apprehension by any of them that they would be seized or detained in any 
meaningful way.”99  The Court’s focus on the effect of these questions was 
key to its decision.100 
At several points in its analysis the Court downplayed the significance 
of questioning by INS agents.101  Instead of describing the stationed INS 
agents as preventing workers from leaving, the Court instead describes 
their purpose as ensuring everyone was questioned.102  The Court goes on 
to write, “[t]he only way the issue of individual questioning could be 
presented would be if one of the named respondents had in fact been 
                                                
confronted with a white officer, which could cause the suspect to consent to searches which 
he might otherwise deny); Dwight L. Greene, Justice Scalia and Tonto, Judicial Pluralistic 
Ignorance, and the Myth of Colorless Individualism in Bostick v. Florida, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1979, 
2039–40 (1993) (illustrating the flaws in how Bostick fails to take race into account with an 
illuminating account of Kenneth Moore, a black University of Texas Law student who was 
stopped and searched without consent and then signed a Consent to Search form under the 
officers’ “strong suggestion”); Evan M. McGuire, Consensual Police-Citizen Encounters:  
Human Factors of a Reasonable Person and Individual Bias, 16 SCHOLAR 693, 703 (2014) 
(discussing the inconsistency in the case law concerning the difference between consensual 
interaction and restraint). 
96 See Carbado, supra note 95, at 1554 (identifying different factors which are often shaped 
by race, including the officer’s conduct as well as how the suspect responds and experiences 
the encounter). 
97 See Capers, supra note 95, at 220 (noting the conspicuous absence of any mention of race 
in the majority opinions of both Delgado and Bostick as evidence of the Supreme Court’s 
blindness to racial issues). 
98 See Delgado, 446 U.S. at 220–21 (discussing how INS agents were merely asking the 
factory workers questions while the workers moved freely around the factory and continued 
to carry out their job duties). 
99 Id. at 219 (articulating another facet of the “reasonable person” test while continuing to 
blindly ignore racial differences in the perception of authority figures). 
100 See id. at 220–21 (holding that the questioning of factory workers by INS agents was 
merely consensual encounters and not Fourth Amendment seizures). 
101 See id. at 216, 219 (characterizing INS agents’ questioning of the factory workers as 
“nothing more than a brief encounter”). 
102 See id. at 218 (discounting the factory workers’ argument that the placement of INS 
agents at the factory exits demonstrates an intent to prevent workers from leaving). 
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seized or detained.”103  When respondents argued that the consequences 
of remaining silent to those questions would likely lead to detention, the 
Court dismissed such concerns.104  “This conduct should have given 
respondents no reason to believe that they would be detained if they gave 
truthful answers to the questions put to them or they simply refused to 
answer.”105  The irony, of course, is that the conduct described in the 
previous sentence, “[c]onsisted simply of questioning employees and 
arresting those they had probable cause to believe were unlawfully present in the 
factory.”106  According to the Court, questioning by INS agents was not 
intrusive and unlikely to cause a “reasonable person” to conclude that 
detention would occur upon refusal to answer this question.107  Yet, the 
Court does not explain exactly how or why questioning is not intrusive or 
enough on its own to trigger a seizure analysis.108  One important clue laid 
out by the Court at the start of its analysis: 
Although we have yet to rule directly on whether mere 
questioning of an individual by a police official, without 
more, can amount to a seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment, our recent decision in Royer, [], plainly 
implies that interrogation relating to one’s identity or a 
request for identification by the police does not, by itself, 
constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.”109 
While the Court does not use this formulation in its latter analysis, it 
frames the questions about one’s citizenship as about one’s identity.110  
This is a key assertion.  By framing the questions as merely requesting 
identity, the Delgado Court can describe such questions as being less 
                                                
103 Id. at 219 (citations omitted). 
104 See Delgado, 446 U.S. at 220 (sidestepping the gross imbalance of power and 
vulnerability between a white INS agent and a Hispanic factory worker by claiming that it 
was obvious that the INS agents were merely questioning people). 
105 Id. at 218 (emphasis added). 
106 Id. (citations omitted and emphasis added).  It is likely that because the respondents in 
this particular case were either U.S. Citizens, or lawful permanent residents, truthful answers 
on their part would not have led to detention.  Id.  However, as discussed infra, the ability to 
discern how agents would react to a silent worker is unclear.  See infra Part II (illustrating the 
variety of reactions an agent can have to a silent worker). 
107 See Delgado, 446 U.S. at 219 (“The questioning of each respondent by INS agents seems 
to have been nothing more than a brief encounter.”). 
108 See id. at 216 (deferring to an example from a prior case in which police officers 
physically and forcibly detained the defendant to determine his identity, rather than 
articulating the legal framework at issue). 
109 Id. (emphasis added). 
110 See id. at 212–13 (revealing that the only questions asked by the INS agents related to 
the employee’s citizenship, and that the questionings were motivated by a concerted effort 
to target illegal aliens). 
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intrusive.111  And yet, the Court overlooks that unlike police who may ask 
identifying questions to investigate other criminal activity, the INS agent’s 
questions on citizenship status was the key element that the agents were 
looking for.112  These questions were precisely not to “identify” people, 
but rather were the heart of the INS agent’s investigative duties.113 
The nature of these questions also highlights the difficulty in using an 
“objective” standard in analyzing the intrusiveness of the INS agents’ 
actions.114  For instance, just as a black individual travelling or riding the 
bus may feel a different sense of his or her ability to terminate a law 
enforcement encounter, a Latino worker may feel the force of questioning 
about his or her citizenship quite differently.115  U.S. citizens, especially 
white ones, may feel no intrusion in a public space being asked about 
citizenship or birthplace.116  However, a racial minority, especially a 
Latino, whether a U.S. citizen or not, may feel the experience in quite a 
different manner.117  In the Delgado decision, the Court made two separate 
                                                
111 See Delgado, 446 U.S. at 238–39 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (criticizing the majority’s 
characterization of the INS agents’ conduct as minimally intrusive). 
112 See id. at 233–34 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (highlighting the Court’s oversight in 
failing to recognize that the INS agents were instructed to interrogate “virtually all persons 
employed by a company,” rather than specifically focusing on questioning potentially 
relevant sources as a police officer might do when investigating criminal activity).  
113 See id. at 212 (describing the INS agents’ interaction with employees as specifically 
asking questions relating to the employees’ citizenship rather than their identity). 
114 See id. at 216–17 (emphasizing the Supreme Court’s willful blindness towards the 
inherent racial tensions between vulnerable minorities and white law enforcement officials 
through their holding that the Fourth Amendment only imposes an objective justification for 
seizure if the person under interrogation refuses to answer and law enforcement takes 
additional steps such as physical violence). 
115 See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounters” Some Preliminary Thoughts About 
Fourth Amendment Seizures:  Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 254–55 (1991) 
(rebuking the Supreme Court’s view in Bostick that police encounters do not invoke the 
Fourth Amendment, not because black men are unaware of their rights, but because a history 
and culture of oppression has led to a widespread distrust among African Americans that 
the police will respect their rights).  See also Carbado, supra note 95, at 1559–60 (discussing 
how a Latino worker may feel when questioned about their citizenship and four significant 
dimensions of the racial aspect). 
116 See Sebastian Murdock, Border Patrol Agents Detain Teacher, Her Kids For Refusing to Claim 
Citizenship, HUFFINGTON POST (July 25, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ 
teacher-children-detained-by-border-patrol-agents-for-refusing-to-claim-citizenship_us_ 
59777bb6e4b0c95f375f16a7 [https://perma.cc/E4FA-BYDQ] (expressing that even though, 
as a white woman, she felt no intrusion when asked about her citizenship, she refused to 
answer or cooperate as an act of protest against the discriminatory practices of police and 
INS agents against minorities). 
117 See LEO CHAVEZ, THE LATINO THREAT:  CONSTRUCTING IMMIGRANTS, CITIZENS, AND THE 
NATION 14–16 (Stan. U. Press ed. 2008) (describing citizenship as a source of identity and 
solidarity that extends far beyond the mere legal designation, especially for Latinos).  See also 
Vilma Ortiz & Edward Telles, Racial Identity and Racial Treatment of Mexican Americans, 4 RACE 
& SOC. PROBLEM 41, 53–54 (2012) (reiterating the pervasive racism and its effect on a 
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observations: (1) that after questioning by INS officers, “[i]f the employee 
gave an unsatisfactory response or admitted that he was an alien, the 
employee was asked to produce immigration papers,” and (2) “The record 
indicates that the INS agents’ conduct in this case consisted simply of 
questioning employees and arresting those they had probable cause to 
believe were unlawfully present in the factory.”118  What is not clear is 
what exactly is an “unsatisfactory response” and what could constitute 
“probable cause” in that circumstance.119  This is not a scenario where the 
agents could check fingerprints and find any past immigration records.120  
What is also not clear is what type of response other than a truthful 
admission as to undocumented status was being referred to by the Court 
as an “unsatisfactory” response.121  The Court did not elaborate, but given 
the respondents’ citizenship statuses, we do not have information on 
whether or how remaining silent or a refusal to answer an INS agent’s 
inquiries on citizenship status would be viewed by the Court.122  As shown 
in the next scenario, the question of how pre-arrest or even pre-seizure 
silence can be treated is not clear.123 
B. Muehler v. Mena—Invoking Silence and Identity 
If there is a Fourth Amendment seizure, what is the constitutional 
significance of questions about citizenship?  Long before Arizona passed 
its version of “papers, please” whereby officers were required to try and 
                                                
Hispanic’s state of mind and feeling of vulnerability to government forces, including agents 
of the INS); Associated Press, Latinos Talk Health, Discrimination, Immigration in New Poll, NBC 
NEWS (Mar. 24, 2015, 10:42AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/poll-lations-talk-
health-discrimination-immigration-n329211 [https://perma.cc/2NC6-F74E] (“And though 
three-quarters of those surveyed were either citizens or legal permanent residents, 13 
percent said they had avoided talking to police or reporting a crime because they did not 
want to be asked or bothered about their citizenship status.”); Eyder Peralta, You Say You’re 
an American, But what if you had to Prove it or Be Deported?, NPR (Dec. 22, 2016), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/the two-way/2016/12/22/504031635/you-say-you-re-an-
american-but-what-if-you-had-to-prove-it-or-be-deported. [https://perma.cc/V3RL-
BUPH] (highlighting the implicit racial discrimination, especially in regard to immigration, 
that plagues the rights of legal American citizens as well as resident aliens). 
118 Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 212 (1984). 
119 See generally id. at 212–13 (showing that the two phrases are used throughout the 
decision but are never clearly defined). 
120 See id. at 211–12 (outlining how the surveys took place at the employers’ factories, which 
are places that do not provide the resources to allow officers to check fingerprints or past 
immigration records). 
121 See id. at 212–13 (stating that the Court references unsatisfactory responses but does not 
define what constitutes one). 
122 See id. at 213–14 (indicating that all of the respondents in the litigation were either U.S. 
Citizens or had lawful status to work). 
123 See infra Part II.B (discussing pre-arrest and pre-seizure silence). 
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ascertain the citizenship status of those they have arrested or stopped, a 
young woman sued the police department for detaining and questioning 
her about her citizenship status during the execution of a search 
warrant.124  Iris Mena was asleep when a SWAT team entered her 
bedroom, handcuffed her and two other occupants, and moved them into 
the garage during a search for evidence relating to criminal gang 
activity.125  Because the search was being conducted against a street gang 
“composed primarily of illegal immigrants” the police also brought along 
an INS officer.126  The INS officer asked for each detainee’s name, date and 
place of birth, and immigration status.127  Mena provided information 
indicating that she was a lawful permanent resident, later provided 
documentation, and was released.128  Mena sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
alleging that the detention and questioning violated her Fourth 
Amendment rights.129  The appellate court found that Mena’s prolonged 
detention violated the Fourth Amendment, but more importantly, that the 
questioning itself by the INS agent was a separate violation of the Fourth 
Amendment from the detention.130 
The Court’s analysis was sparse, relying on Bostick and Delgado, 
finding that “mere questioning” did not constitute an additional seizure, 
and because the initial detention was not “prolonged,” no violation 
occurred.131  At first blush, Mena appears to just be an extension of Delgado, 
which it is from a purely precedential perspective.132  However, additional 
                                                
124 See 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 113 (S.B. 1070) (to be codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 13-2929) (mandating that officers must verify or ascertain an alien’s immigration status 
when making a stop).  See generally Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 95 (2005) (presenting a 
Supreme Court case in which Iris Mena sued members of a police department for being 
detained during a search of her premise). 
125 See Mena, 544 U.S. at 96 (describing the events that took place when a SWAT team 
initially started their search of Mena’s premise). 
126 See id. (explaining that the SWAT team informed and brought along an INS officer to 
the search due to their awareness that the gang was mostly made up of illegal immigrants). 
127 See id. (displaying that the INS asked for detainees’ names, dates and places of birth, 
and immigration status from those who were detained in the garage during the search). 
128 See id. (confirming that Mena had provided papers proving she was a lawful permanent 
resident and was released before the officers left). 
129 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (outlining that a person may bring suit against another for 
being subjected to the depravation of any of their rights).  See also Muehler, 544 U.S. at 96 
(showing that Mena had alleged that she was illegally detained in violation of her Fourth 
Amendment rights). 
130 See Muehler, 544 U.S. at 97 (stating that the appellate court found both the detention and 
questioning of Mena were separate violations of her Fourth Amendment rights). 
131 See id. at 101 (displaying how the Court used both the Bostick and Delgado cases as 
support for their finding).  
132 See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 212 (1984) (discussing how an INS officer questioning 
an individual about their citizenship does not amount to a detention or seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment). 
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insights are revealed when the factual scenario is extended. What if Mena 
had refused to answer questions relating to her immigration status? What 
if, instead of telling the INS agent that she was a lawful permanent 
resident, she stayed silent? Could the INS agent extend her detention? 
Could the INS agent even arrest her? The answer may lie in two decisions:  
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada133 and Salinas v. Texas.134 
When analyzing the Delgado facts, the Court found it was instrumental 
that the INS agents were only asking questions and that nothing indicated 
that refusal to answer those questions would lead to detention.135  As 
presented in Mena, the questions themselves did not lead to additional 
detention.136  But in Hiibel, a person not only had their detention prolonged 
after refusing to answer questions, but was also arrested.137  The Supreme 
Court found such a practice in compliance with both the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment.138  The Court quoted Delgado’s declaration that 
“interrogation” relating to identity and requesting identification did not 
normally constitute a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.139  The 
Court articulated why questioning on identity is reasonable to further the 
interests of stops based on Terry v. Ohio, noting, “[k]nowledge of identity 
may inform an officer that a suspect is wanted for another offense, or has 
a record of violence or mental disorder.  On the other hand, knowing 
identity may help clear a suspect and allow the police to concentrate their 
efforts elsewhere.”140  The Court noted that allowing officers to question 
individuals and compel them to answer did not transform the nature of 
Terry stops in either nature, duration, or location.141  Under the Fourth 
Amendment, not only are questions by the police reasonable, but 
compelling answers to certain questions by individuals detained in a Terry 
                                                
133 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004) (holding that arresting a Terry stop suspect for refusal to identify 
himself did not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
134 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2180 (2013) (stating that prosecution’s use of noncustodial silence was 
not in violation of the Fifth Amendment). 
135 See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216–17 (1984) (describing how, although most people answer 
questions posed by police without being told they are free to refuse, they may refuse to 
answer questions without being detained for refusing). 
136 See Muehler, 544 U.S. at 101 (discussing how the questioning of Mena did not prolong 
her detention). 
137 See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 182 (showing that Hiibel was detained and arrested for refusing 
to identify himself). 
138 See id. at 184–85, 191 (stating that the arrest and conviction was lawful under both the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments). 
139 See id. at 185–86 (explaining that the Court makes the interesting decision to transform 
what is seen as a statement of dicta, whereas the Delgado court specifically made clear that 
the issue was open). 
140 Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 186 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968)). 
141 See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 178 (explaining that an officer’s reasonable suspicion of a person 
permits them to take reasonable additional steps to investigate). 
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stop is also reasonable.142  But what about the Fifth Amendment’s right 
against self-incrimination?143  The defendant in Hiibel protested that 
compelling him to answer the questions on his identity would violate his 
Fifth Amendment right, namely forcing him to not be silent in the face of 
questions on his identity.144  Noting that Miranda was not in play as Hiibel 
was not arrested during the questioning on identity, the Court ruled that 
“petitioner’s refusal to disclose his name was not based on any articulated 
real and appreciable fear that his name would be used to incriminate him, 
or that it ‘would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to 
prosecute’ him.”145  Because the Self Incrimination Clause only protects 
against incriminating disclosures, it is unavailable unless the petitioner 
could explain why his name and identity would be incriminating.146  The 
Court went on to write, “[o]ne’s identity is, by definition, unique; yet it is, 
in another sense, a universal characteristic.  Answering a request to 
disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to 
be incriminating only in unusual circumstances.”147  Utilizing the 
statement from Delgado into a full-fledged holding, the Hiibel Court 
essentially found that asking for identity is not intrusive for Fourth 
Amendment purposes and not incriminating for Fifth Amendment 
purposes.148  Therefore, compulsion to give up one’s identity is usually 
allowable.149 
Even if giving up information about one’s identity was protected, 
staying silent in the face of questioning is not an option.150  When the Court 
granted certiorari in Salinas v. Texas,151 the hope was that a circuit split as 
to how pre-arrest silence could be treated would be decided.152  In some 
circuits, pre-arrest silence could be used as proof of guilt, and in others, it 
was disallowed.153  Instead of deciding whether pre-arrest silence could 
                                                
142 See id. at 188–89 (describing the justification for compelling answers being reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment). 
143 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (outlining the right against self-incrimination). 
144 See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 189 (expounding that the petitioner in Hiibel alleged that his Fifth 
Amendment rights were violated by being required to state his identity). 
145 Id. at 190 (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (citations omitted)). 
146 See id. at 190–91 (explaining that stating one’s identity does not, in and of itself, 
incriminate, which means that it is not protected under the Fifth Amendment). 
147 Id. at 191. 
148 See id. at 2463–64 (holding that inquiring about one’s identity is not intrusive for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment). 
149 See id. (observing that compulsion to give up one’s identity is usually allowable). 
150 See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 (2013) (discussing the negative effects of 
staying silent during questioning). 
151 See id. 
152 See id. (observing the Court’s refusal to resolve the circuit split in this case). 
153 See Aaron R. Pettit, Should the Prosecution be Allowed to Comment on a Defendant’s Pre-
Arrest Silence in its Case-in-Chief?, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 181, 192–93 (1997) (describing the circuit 
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be used in court, the Salinas Court decided the case much more narrowly 
and required a specific invocation requirement for the right to silence.154  
Somewhat ironically, the right to silence cannot be used by staying 
silent.155  If you wish to be silent and not have it used against you, you 
must verbally “invoke” your right.156  In Salinas, the petitioner voluntarily 
accompanied the police to the station and when asked whether his 
shotgun would match the shells found at the scene of the murder, 
“[d]eclined to answer.  Instead the petitioner ‘[l]ooked down at the floor, 
shuffled his feet, bit his bottom lip, cl[e]nched his hands on in his lap, [and] 
began to tighten up.’”157  This reaction was used in his trial to convict him 
for murder.158  The Supreme Court was asked to decide whether pre-arrest 
and pre-Miranda silence could be used against him, not just for 
impeachment, but as proof of guilt in his trial.159  The Supreme Court left 
this answer open, and instead ruled that the right to silence was never 
implicated at all.160 
In deciding the Salinas case, the Supreme Court laid out the general 
rule that the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause requires a 
witness to claim the privilege.161  The rule was to give notice to the 
government who could either argue against the granting of the privilege 
or provide immunity to cure the self-incrimination.  Moreover, the Court 
pointed out that it gave courts a chance to evaluate the claims of privilege 
itself.162  Of course, the Court did not point out that the rule on invocation 
and its justifications contemplate using the Fifth Amendment privilege in 
the context of a trial.163  When a witness refuses to answer a question, the 
court and the opposing advocate must understand the basis for the 
                                                
split, which allows pre-arrest silence to be used as proof of guilt in some circuits, but not in 
others). 
154 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180–82 (discussing that the Court decision and the notion that 
the right to silence must be verbally invoked to be utilized). 
155 See id. (addressing that the right to silence must be verbally initiated). 
156 See id. at 2183 (holding that a person must verbally invoke the right to stay silent). 
157  Id. at 2178. 
158 See id. (describing the facts of the case, where silence was used to convict the petitioner 
of murder). 
159 See id. at 2179 (determining how a person’s decision to remain silent may be presented 
at trial).  
160 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2184 (demonstrating the lack implication of one’s right to silence 
during questioning by law enforcement). 
161 See id. at 2184 (describing the decision by the Supreme Court laying out the general rule 
that the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination clause requires a witness to claim the 
privilege). 
162 See id. at 2179–80 (conveying the decision of the Supreme Court to allow courts to 
evaluate decisions of privilege on their own). 
163 See id. at 2182–83 (stating that the Court did not point out that the rule on invocation 
contemplates using the Fifth Amendment privilege in the context of a trial). 
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refusal—is it simply because the witness is uncomfortable or is the 
information incriminating?164  By being a witness in a trial, the person is 
already under a compulsion to testify and can only avoid testifying if a 
privilege is in play.165  But the situation faced by the defendant in Salinas 
was very different.166  The defendant was not at trial, nor was he called as 
a witness, and as the Court points out repeatedly, the person was not 
under arrest (and presumably could have terminated the law enforcement 
encounter).167  The Court does not bother explaining why law enforcement 
needs to be informed as to the reason for the privilege—the lack of notice 
and requirement for a neutral arbiter to decide the properness of staying 
silent appears to be lacking.168  The Court sidesteps the question of 
whether pre-arrest silence can be used against someone at trial, but then 
imposes a requirement of invocation of the right to remain silent in the 
face of law enforcement inquiry.169  This requirement has come under fire 
for a variety of reasons.170  The problems with creating a burden for 
criminal defendants of specific invocation holds true for non-citizens 
facing removal.171  The requirement of invocation for non-English 
speakers who may not be versed in their rights to invoke a right that they 
are not yet notified of, is likely a bridge too far for most.172 
                                                
164 See id. (observing the responsibility of the advocate to determine the basis for refusal to 
answer). 
165 See id. at 2180 (describing how a person can only avoid testifying if a privilege is 
invoked). 
166 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178 (observing how this case differed from previous situations 
because the Defendant was not present at the trial). 
167 See id. (discussing how this case differed from previous situations because the 
Defendant was not present at the trial). 
168 See Drew Thomas, Comment, Salinas v. Texas:  Why Silence is No Longer Golden, and What 
that Means for Texas Citizens and Police Agencies, 16 TEX. ADMIN. L.J. 247, 264 (2014) (“Allowing 
a jury to draw an inference of guilt based on silence or body language is a poor substitute for 
solid evidence and will likely lead to more wrongful convictions in Texas.”).  
169 See id. (discussing the requirement of the invocation of the right to remain silent in the 
face of law enforcement inquiry). 
170 See Brian Donovan, Why Salinas v. Texas Blurs the Line Between Voluntary Interviews and 
Custodial Interrogations, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 213, 220 (2014) (conveying the decision in Salinas 
as allowing a voluntary interview setting as evidence of guilt).  See also Brandon L. 
Garrett, Remaining Silent After Salinas, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 116, 119 (2013) (describing 
the decision in Salinas as limiting its definition of “formal arrest”); Courtney Smith, 
Remaining Silent While Police Get Frisky:  After Salinas, Can Silence During a Terry Stop Be Used 
as Admission of Guilt?, 50 VAL. U. L. REV. 819 (2016) (reiterating the Court’s decision that 
silence is tantamount to taking time to think of a lie). 
171 See Michael Kagan, Immigration Law’s Looming Fourth Amendment Problem, GEO. L.J. 125, 
129–30 (2015) (observing the burden for criminal defendants of specific invocation). 
172 See id. at 161 (discussing the ability of non-English speakers to invoke a right that they 
are both unaware of and not notified of). 
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To understand how silence in this scenario may fall short specifically 
in the removal context, let’s return to the facts of Muehler v. Mena.  Instead 
of simply answering the questions posed by the INS agent about her 
citizenship, let’s assume that Ms. Mena tried to remain silent.173  From the 
Salinas holding, Ms. Mena could not remain silent in the face of 
questioning by the INS agent.174  To gain any protection from silence, she 
would be forced to specifically inform the agent that her refusal to answer 
questions is based on her claim of a right to remain silent.175  At this point 
it is unclear what would the consequences of her invocation and refusal to 
answer would be.176  Could silence, even if properly invoked, allow the 
INS agent to find “probable cause” that she is in the United States illegally, 
and thus trigger the INS’s power to arrest those who the officer believes is 
in the United States without authorization?177 
While some circuit courts have found that pre-arrest silence cannot be 
used to convict a person,178 others have not followed suit and instead 
allowed silence to be used.179  One court found in the context of 
obstruction statutes180 silence could not be the basis for a probable cause 
arrest.181  Yet, the key question in that case was whether the obstruction 
statute defined obstruction to include silence, as the court wrote, “[t]he 
                                                
173 Muehler v. Mena, 125 S. Ct. 1465, 1468–69 (2005) (observing what would have happened 
had Ms. Mena remained silent). 
174 Compare id. at 1468–69 with Salina v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2184 (2013) (conveying the 
holding in Salinas that the defendant could not simply remain silent in the face of 
questioning). 
175 Compare Muehler, 125 S. Ct. at 1468–69 with Salina, 133 S. Ct. at 2184 (comparing the 
specific content of her invocation is not clear, but the Court does require more than just 
silence). 
176 Compare Muehler, 125 S. Ct. at 1468–69 with Salina, 133 S. Ct. at 2184 (reiterating the 
discussion of the Court in Salinas clarifying what the consequences of her refusal to answer 
would be). 
177 Compare Muehler, 125 S. Ct. at 1468–69 with Salina, 133 S. Ct. at 2184  (describing the 
question that the Court in Salinas was tasked with answering). 
178 See United States v. Okatan, 728 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2013) (describing the 2nd Circuit’s 
position that prohibits pre-arrest silence from being used to convict a person). 
179 See United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102, 1111 (8th Cir. 2005) (describing the 
overwhelming evidence establishing the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt); 
United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1991) (explaining descriptions of the 
defendant’s behavior being deemed constitutionally problematic); United States v. Love, 767 
F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir. 1985) (conveying exigencies of the circumstances surrounding the 
defendant’s apprehension necessitated a warrantless arrest). 
180 See Kaufman v. Higgs, 697 F.3d 1297, 1302 (10th Cir. 2012) (discussing that probable 
cause only arises when an officer reasonably suspects a criminal act has been committed). 
“Because no officer could reasonably have thought Mr. Kaufman's silence constituted a 
criminal act, the Defendants violated his clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be 
free from unreasonable seizures.”  Id.  
181 See id. (observing that failing to respond to questioning is not a basis for a probable 
cause arrest). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 2 [2018], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol52/iss2/3
2018] The Promise and Failure of Silence 311 
law was well established that a citizen has no obligation to answer an 
officer’s questions during a consensual encounter; and the Colorado 
Supreme Court had made it clear that the Colorado obstruction statute is 
not violated by mere verbal opposition to an officer’s questioning . . . .”182  
However, this situation is far less clear when dealing with immigration 
officers’ questioning of non-citizens.183  A federal statute authorizes 
questioning and detention by an immigration officer if the officer “has 
reason to believe”184 the person is in the United States without 
authorization.185  Could silence be used to justify arrest?186  The question 
may lay with how seriously one takes the dicta in Delgado that categorized 
questions about citizenship as synonymous with questions on identity.187  
Does the federal statute under 8 U.S.C § 1357188 act in a similar way to the 
stop-and-identify statute at issue in Hiibel?189  The statute itself does not 
specifically allow the arrest of those who remain silent, so perhaps the 
reasoning of Hiibel is limited, especially since citizenship status is 
undoubtedly incriminating unlike one’s name.190  Nonetheless, this is an 
open area as to whether someone’s silence in a pre-arrest posture could be 
the basis for probable cause for arrest.191  Given both the posture of how 
silence in a pre-arrest stage can be used to find guilt for criminal cases in 
some circuits, combined with treating citizenship status as an “identity” 
question, the risk that silence—even if properly invoked could constitute 
a basis for an administrative arrest is high.192  An arrest would bring about 
                                                
182 Id. at 1304 (citations omitted). 
183 See Kagan, supra note 171, at 129–30 (observing the burden for non-English speaking 
criminal defendants of specific invocation). 
184 See id. at 158 (describing the reason-to-believe standard mirrors probable cause in some 
circumstances, though even probable cause is not clear in the administrative detention 
context). 
185 See id. (conveying the effect of the officer having reason to believe that the person is in 
the United States illegally). 
186 See INS v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1765 (1984) (discussing the effect of citizenship and 
identity on silence in the face of a question by authority). 
187 See id. (analogizing questions about citizenship to questions on identity). 
188 See 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (2012) (“Any officer or employee of the Service authorized under 
regulations prescribed by the Attorney General shall have power without warrant- (1) to 
interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to remain in the 
United States”). 
189 See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 193–94 (2004) (establishing 
that asking for one’s identity is not intrusive for purposes of the Fourth Amendment). 
190 See Powers of Immigration Officers and Employees, 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (2012) (describing 
the powers of immigration officers to make arrests and demonstrating that remaining silent 
is not granted to immigrants in the statute). 
191 See id. (discussing what applies as probable cause for making an arrest). 
192 See id. (explaining that officers have a right to arrest aliens if the officers believe that an 
alien is in violation of any such United States law or regulation). 
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additional protections when it comes to silence, but as we will see, it also 
brings with it certain limitations. 
C. United States v. Palacios193—Miranda and Its exceptions 
Hector Palacios was arrested by a private citizen on February 27, 2017, 
after the citizen heard gunshots being fired and saw Mr. Palacios 
discharge a weapon into the air.194  Mr. Palacios was eventually detained 
at the Harris County detention center where during booking an 
immigration officer (Enforcement and Removal Officer, or ERO) 
interviewed him and asked about his identity and immigration status 
while filling out an I-213 form, which is used during the deportation 
process.195  No Miranda warnings were given and Mr. Palacios answered 
the questions asked of him and told the ERO that he was a Mexican 
citizen.196  Mr. Palacios was later charged with being undocumented and 
possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) and for illegal 
reentry after conviction of a felony in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 
(b)(1) in federal criminal court.197  Mr. Palacios argued that the statements 
regarding his citizenship status and identity as a Mexican citizen was 
obtained after his arrest and without a Miranda warning, and he sought to 
suppress the information in his criminal trial.198  The Court rejected the 
suppression motion, and the statements were used in his criminal case.199 
The right to silence is at its zenith when coupled with the warnings 
required by Miranda.200  Not only are people required to be notified of their 
“right to silence,” but also their silence cannot be used as evidence of guilt, 
and the right to silence includes the right to “shut off” questioning by the 
police and one’s right to silence must be waived before additional 
                                                
193 See No. 17-221-01, 2017 WL 2378924 at *1 (S.D. Texas 2017) (showing that Officer Munoz 
did not give Palacios his Miranda warnings, but instead asked Palacios about his identity 
and immigration status). 
194 See id. (conveying that Palacios was arrested for discharging gunshots into the air in 
Texas and was detained by a private citizen who placed him in handcuffs). 
195 See id. (explaining that Palacios stated, “he was born in Mexico” and “is a citizen of 
Mexico”). 
196 See id. (expressing that Palacios was not given Miranda warnings, but told the officers 
of his citizenship in Mexico). 
197 See id. (showing that Palacios was faced with a two-count indictment for being an illegal 
alien and for possessing a firearm). 
198 See Palacios, WL 2378924 at *2 (expressing that the lack of giving the Miranda warnings 
violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights). 
199 See id. at *5 (reasoning that the statements made to the officer did not require a Miranda 
warning and the statements were obtained in a lawful manner). 
200 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966) (stating at the right to remain silent is 
an absolute right guaranteed and that these warnings must be read). 
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questioning could continue.201  This naturally leads to the conclusion that 
for non-citizens who are arrested, which is when Miranda and its progeny 
would apply, the right to silence might protect against not only criminal 
prosecution, but also against civil deportation enforcement.202  If Miranda 
applied post-arrest, then would a non-citizen be informed of their ability 
to stay quiet when asked about their citizenship status?203  And would 
they be able to prevent any further questions relating to their status 
completely?204  The unfortunate reality is that thousands of people being 
asked questions about their immigration status are not given their Miranda 
warnings and this practice has been condoned by many lower federal 
courts.205 
Not all custodial questioning by law enforcement requires Miranda 
warnings.206  The Supreme Court in a plurality opinion in Pennsylvania v. 
Muniz207 set out what has become known as the “booking exception” to 
Miranda.208  Essentially, certain administrative questions need not be 
accompanied by Miranda warnings, and a suspect’s incriminating answers 
could be used against them.209  Anjana Malhotra writes in her article, The 
Immigrant and Miranda, how many lower federal courts since the Muniz 
decision have misapplied its holding and caused considerable doctrinal 
                                                
201 See id. at 444 (providing procedural safeguards that are in place and that the right to 
remain silent is continuous).  
202 See United States v. Salgado, 292 F.3d 1169, 1171 (2002) (addressing that Salgado was 
not given his Miranda warning before the interview and was deported). 
203 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445 (showing that the defendant was never given effective 
warnings of his rights at the start of the interrogation process). 
204 See id. (discussing the constitutional issue of admissibility of statements where the 
defendant was questioned while in custody and not given his full warnings). 
205 See Salgado, 292 F.3d at 1177 (holding that the jailhouse interview conducted by an INS 
agent, after defendant was arrested, was not custodial interrogation that required Miranda 
warnings).  
206 See id. at 1172 (detailing that the test to determine whether questioning is deemed 
interrogation is whether “under all of the circumstances involved in a given case, the 
questions are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response”). 
207 See 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (stating that Muniz was convicted of driving under the influence 
and provided officers with slurred answers before he received his Miranda warning, this was 
not testimonial). Furthermore, “Muniz’s answers to these first seven questions are 
nonetheless admissible because the questions fall within a ‘routine booking question’ 
exception which exempts from Miranda’s coverage questions to secure the ‘biographical data 
necessary to complete booking or pretrial services.’”  Id. at 601.  
208 See id. at 607 (finding that the birthday question was given by police to check how well 
Muniz could do a basic math problem, but had this only been about the date of his birth it 
would have fallen under the booking exception). 
209 See id. at 601 (showing that any question asked during booking does not fall within the 
booking exception). 
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confusion when applied to non-citizens in custodial settings.210  The Court 
in Palacios applied the booking exception and found that the questions 
relating to the defendant’s citizenship status need not be suppressed even 
though they were not accompanied by the Miranda warnings.211 
Citizenship and national origin questions are commonly included at 
the booking stage, regardless of whether an immigration official is at the 
jail or if only local police or jail staff are asking the questions.212  Because 
these questions are often asked with other demographic and 
administrative questions, Miranda warnings are not given before asking 
questions relating to citizenship status or nationality.213  If the detainee 
later faces a criminal prosecution for migration-related crimes and 
evidence of one’s citizenship status is based on the answers given during 
this questioning, federal criminal courts must decide whether these 
incriminating answers should be suppressed for lack of a Miranda 
warning.214  Just like in the Palacios case, the government often argues that 
the officer asking the questions on birthplace and citizenship status did so 
with an “administrative purpose,” that the questions were not intended 
to elicit incriminating responses, or that the officer is “[n]ot involved with 
deciding whether the defendant would be prosecuted.”215  These reasons 
persuade the lower federal courts to apply the booking exception, often 
using the subjective intent of the officer as controlling given the overlap 
between the civil aspect of removal proceedings and the criminal 
prosecution of migration-related crimes.216  Ms. Malhotra convincingly 
argues that a reliance on the subjective intent as a rationale in lower court 
decisions run afoul of the Supreme Court’s rulings on both the nature of 
interrogation217 and the booking exception altogether.218 
                                                
210 See Anjana Malhotra, The Immigrant and Miranda, 66 SMU L. REV. 277, 294–95 (2013) 
(pointing out that a circuit split exists on whether questioning detained suspects in dual civil-
criminal immigration inquiries constitutes immigration). 
211 See United States v. Palacios, No. 17-221-01, 2017 WL 2378924 at *6 (holding that the 
officer would have obtained the information that Palacios sought to suppress). 
212 See Appendix for copies of various booking forms. 
213 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461–62 (1966) (explaining that prior to any 
questioning, the person must be warned of the right to remain silent, which applies to 
questioning related to citizenship status). 
214 See id. at 461 (furthering that if a confession is not voluntary, the Fifth Amendment must 
be looked at to address whether he has become a witness against himself). 
215 Palacios, 2017 WL 2378924 at *4. 
216 See Rhode Island v. Innes, 446 U.S. 291, 311 (1980) (expressing that the author would 
use the objective standard to avoid the difficulties of proof). 
217 See id. at 301 (requiring an objective rather than subjective analysis of whether a 
statement is intended to elicit a response). 
218 See Malhotra, supra note 210, at 302 (providing that nearly all courts have departed from 
the Supreme Court’s rulings that Miranda rights apply to custodial questioning). 
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According to Ms. Malhotra, the proper inquiry should not be focused 
on:  (1) subjective intent of the officer asking the question; or even (2) 
objectively whether the questions are intended for deportation or criminal 
purposes.219  Instead the focus should be only on whether the risk of 
criminal prosecutions from such interrogation is sufficiently high.220  And 
while Ms. Malhotra points out that at least some courts do appear to 
properly follow Supreme Court precedent,221 many misapply the rule 
from Mathis222 and continue to rely heavily on the non-criminal and civil 
purpose of the questions.223  The fact of an increasing rate of federal 
prosecutions for migration-related crimes would tend to support the 
requirement of Miranda warnings for questions relating to national origin 
and citizenship status.224  However, until the courts start following the 
proper analysis, law enforcement currently has little incentive to read 
Miranda warnings to people being booked into jails, whether by local law 
enforcement or by immigration officials.225  Even in jurisdictions that 
would require Miranda warnings, and may suppress the use of the 
answers in criminal cases, the tool of suppression is unlikely to be 
available for removal proceedings and therefore ineffective against 
preventing deportation.226 
Since the Supreme Court decided INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,227 the general 
understanding is that suppression remedies for Fourth Amendment 
violations are unavailable.228  Without suppression, incentives to fix any 
Miranda-related problems at booking for deportation proceedings would 
                                                
219 See id. at 308–09 (stating that instead of trying to determine the likelihood criminal 
charges that could result, courts look to objective facts to show a criminal purpose). 
220 See id. at 310 (expressing that according to United States v. Chen, the court held that 
Miranda rights applied to civil interrogation because the suspect faced a higher risk for 
criminal charges regarding immigration status). 
221 See id. (referring to United States v. Chen, 439 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2006)).  
222 See id. (explaining that by misapplying Mathis the lower courts are allowing officials to 
deprive immigrants of constitutional protections). 
223 See id. at 310 (“Mathis serves as a critical protection for suspects questioned about civil 
and criminal charges by holding that the investigator cannot control the constitutional 
question by placing a civil label on the investigation.”). 
224 See id. at 324 (showing that the rate of prosecuting immigration crimes has risen sharply 
since the 1980s and Congress has increased the penalties or such crimes). 
225 See Jennifer Chacon, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1566 (providing that the noncitizens 
facing a criminal trial under allegations of immigration status can raise concerns of 
Constitutional rights violations). 
226 See id. at 1613 (demonstrating that the need for a remedy of suppression in removal 
proceedings was definite as the widespread abuse of this remedy became clear). 
227 See 468 U.S. 1032, 1050–51 (1982) (holding that an illegal arrest had no bearing on 
upcoming deportation proceedings). 
228 See Chacon, supra note 225, at 1611 (pointing out the rights and remedies gap in removal 
proceedings).  
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be extremely low and in many instances non-existent.229  Given the 
existence and use of the booking exception, coupled with the general lack 
of a suppression remedy in removal proceedings, even those who can 
argue that Miranda should have applied at the booking stage, would mean 
any information gleaned by such questions could be used for deportation 
purposes.230  The civil-criminal divide also plays a crucial role when it 
comes to deciding whether law enforcement can retaliate for silence.231  
What if when Palacio was asked to provide citizenship status information 
he went ahead and let the officer know he was invoking his right to 
silence?232  What type of response could the jail or the immigration official 
have?233  Could the jail officials retaliate for what would be lawful 
invocation of a constitutional right?234  While at first glance it would seem 
necessary to protect a constitutional right from retaliation for using it this 
does not always play out in this fashion during interactions with the 
police. 
In The Immigrant and Miranda, Ms. Malhotra provides a stunning look 
at the practice of a jail in Morris County, New Jersey.235  Jail officials not 
only acknowledged that they do not provide Miranda warnings to inmates 
when asking about citizenship status and place of birth, but they placed 
inmates whom remained silent into solitary confinement until they 
                                                
229 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461 (commenting that the question of whether violations of 
Miranda could give rise to a Section 1983 claim after Chavez v. Martinez is whether the 
violation would be considered so egregious as to constitute a substantive due process 
violation; and given the high bar to pass, incentives to change the practice of providing 
Miranda warnings during booking questions relating to status remain extremely low). 
230 See Chacon, supra note 225, at 1612–13 (noting the lack of incentives to amend the 
deportation proceedings’ egregiousness standard that triggers constitutional protection.  
231 See Malhotra, supra note 210, at 294–95 (discussing the impact of a civil-criminal divide 
in interrogation which arises when a suspect is being interrogated for both civil and criminal 
matters, and creates a problem because Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections are 
generally only extended in a criminal context). 
232 See generally supra notes 193–99 and accompanying text (elaborating on the Palacio’s 
arrest and proceeding attempt by law enforcement to interrogate Palacio). 
233 See generally supra notes 193–99 and accompanying text (noting the consequences of 
Palacio admitting that he was not a U.S. citizen when interrogated by an ERO).  See also infra 
Part III.C and accompanying text (explaining how an incarcerated individual may face 
retaliation for efforts to avoid self-incrimination, which occurred in Morris County jails 
where inmates were placed in solitary confinement for attempting to remain silent during 
questioning). 
234 See generally supra notes 193–99 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of Palacio’s 
arrest and officers’ attempt to interrogate Palacio).  See also infra Part III.C (discussing how 
an incarcerated individual is questioned by officers in jails, and that an individual in jail may 
find themselves a victim of retaliation for attempting to invoke a right to silence). 
235 See Malhotra, supra note 210, at 280–81 (describing the questioning practices used 
toward a suspected illegal immigrant when they are approached by officers while detained 
in jails). 
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spoke.236  Assuming that the inmates at Morris County had a proper Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination, and that they properly 
invoked that right prior to being placed into segregation, what remedies 
would they have?237  The Supreme Court in Chavez v. Martinez limits any 
remedies and implied that the Fifth Amendment’s right against self-
incrimination did not apply.238  In Chavez, the Supreme Court answered a 
long lingering question as to the scope of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-
Incrimination Clause and consequently the potential right to silence.239  
Oliverio Martinez got into a gun-fight with the police, and while he was 
being treated for gun-shot wounds, a police officer by the name of Ben 
Chavez began to interrogate him without providing any Miranda 
warnings, during which Mr. Martinez admitted to pointing a gun at 
another officer and using heroin.240  However, authorities never charged 
Mr. Martinez with a crime;  nonetheless, he brought a civil rights lawsuit 
against Mr. Chavez.241 
The Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination 
Clause was not violated and therefore could not give rise to any remedy, 
despite a clearly coercive interrogation.242  The basis of the Court’s 
decision was that the Fifth Amendment is not violated unless the coerced 
statements were used in a criminal proceeding against Mr. Martinez.243  
According to the Supreme Court, the right against self-incrimination is 
tied explicitly to a trial; and “be[ing] a witness against one-self” is what 
                                                
236 See Malhotra, supra note 210, at 280–81 (detailing the procedures which an officer might 
use when performing an interrogation regarding the citizenship status of an incarcerated 
suspect). 
237 See generally infra Part III.C (discussing interrogations of incarcerated individuals by 
officers at Morris County Jail when an officer is asking questions about a person’s 
immigration status).  See also Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 776 (noting that Martinez was 
unable to establish a claim based on a Fifth Amendment violation by Chavez because 
freedom from police interrogation is not a fundamental right). 
238 See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 770–71 (showing the Court’s refusal to allow a fundamental right 
of silence outside of the context of criminal law). 
239 See id. at 764–66 (noting the outset of the Court’s opinion that the scope of the Fifth 
Amendment did not rise to a level of protecting an individual from being unwillingly 
interrogated by the police). 
240 See id. at 763–64 (outlining the facts of the case, wherein Martinez was shot multiple 
times by an officer after allegedly trying to steal the officer’s gun to use against the officers 
conducting the stop and frisk). 
241 See id. at 764–65 (explaining that despite the incidents involved there was never a formal 
criminal charged filed against Martinez for allegedly attempting to steal an officer’s gun 
while the officer was conducting a frisk). 
242 See id. at 776 (stating the Court’s holding, which elaborated that unwanted questioning 
by police does not rise to the level of a fundamental violation of basic rights which could 
give way to a constitutional claim). 
243 See id. at 766 (noting that the Fifth Amendment is designed to work in criminal 
proceedings). 
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the clause protects against, not the actual coercive behavior of law 
enforcement officials.244  This reasoning is expanded by lower federal 
courts’ opinions on retaliation against silence.245  In the Fifth Circuit, 
Alexander v. City of Round Rock dealt with a traffic stop where the police 
officer asked a driver several questions, and the driver invoked his right 
to remain silent.246  The officer and his partners began to physically assault 
the driver in an alleged act of retaliation.247  While the Fifth Circuit ruled 
that the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable force may 
apply, the Circuit cited to Chavez and ruled that because no statement was 
introduced in court, the Fifth Amendment did not apply despite the clear 
retaliation for silence.248  This interpretation of the Chavez decision, if 
applied to the situation faced by the Morris County inmates, could 
effectively leave the inmates without any remedy against retaliation for a 
valid use of their right to silence.249  As the inmates were already seized 
by law enforcement, whether the Fourth Amendment would provide any 
protection is murky at best.250  Moreover, as long as the jail does not 
attempt to use the Morris County inmates’ silence or eventual coerced 
answers in criminal proceedings, the Fifth Amendment would not 
provide any remedy.251  Even if the defendant in Palacios had knowingly 
invoked the Fifth Amendment and remained silent when asked questions 
about his citizenship status, the jail could conceivably retaliate against 
him, and while his statements would be suppressed from criminal 
proceedings, statements might be used against him in deportation 
proceedings.252 
                                                
244 Chavez, 538 U.S. at 772. 
245 See Alexander v. City of Round Rock, 854 F.3d 298, 307 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding that the 
right to invoke silence was not violated where a suspect was assaulted by police after 
invoking same). 
246 Id. at 302. 
247 See id. (providing details of the brutal assault against Alexander, including being pulled 
violently from his vehicle and having his face violently pressed against the concrete by 
officers stepping on his head). 
248 See id. at 307 (addressing the constitutionality of the officers’ actions against Alexander 
when he attempted to invoke a right to silence when being questioned by the police). 
249 See supra notes 235–48 and accompanying text (describing the constitutionality of 
retaliation against a suspect for exercising Constitutional protections during questioning, 
detention, or other criminal proceedings). 
250 See generally Alexander, 854 F.3d at 302 (discussing the constitutionality of acts 
perpetrated against Alexander when he attempted to invoke a right to silence in response to 
an interrogation by police). 
251 See id. (identifying that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination only 
applies in criminal proceedings and does not apply where charges are not filed). 
252 See supra notes 235–48 and accompanying text (noting the Constitutional rights of 
noncitizens during arrest and detention in regards to interrogation by police about identity 
and immigration status). 
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After finding that the booking exception covered citizenship status 
questions, the Palacios court used an alternative holding to deny 
suppression.253  The Court cites to a Fifth Circuit decision that held that no 
matter the constitutional violation involved, suppression was 
inappropriate in criminal court when it comes to issues of identity.254  
Harking back to the language in Delgado, and expanding the holding in 
Hiibel, the Fifth Circuit ruled that one’s statement of identity cannot be 
suppressed despite a constitutional violation.255  The Fifth Circuit’s 
decision, however, did not just cover one’s name, or just identifying 
information, but rather extended to one’s citizenship status as identity.256  
By equating one’s citizenship status as a demarcation of identity, the Fifth 
Circuit can prevent suppression of clearly incriminating pieces of 
evidence which are required elements of a crime.257  In all three situations, 
the body of law surrounding the Fifth Amendment’s right against 
incrimination and Miranda’s dual-part right258 appear enticing to those 
who wish to keep their immigration status out of law enforcement’s 
detection, but despite tantalizing appearances, the arguments fall apart 
when parsed out into different stages of criminal investigation.259 
III.  CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION STATUS AS IDENTITY 
In February 2008, Professor Anil Kalhan published a law review 
article examining the consequences of interior enforcement of 
immigration laws through the lens of the Fourth Amendment and privacy 
considerations.260  His Article described how interior immigration 
enforcement created a system that relies on state criminal enforcement 
                                                
253 See United States v. Palacio, No. 17-221-01, 2017 WL 2378924, *4–6 (explaining that the 
booking exception did not apply as grounds to avoid the suppression of evidence, but the 
inevitable discovery exception did apply as a method to avoid application of the 
exclusionary rule). 
254 Id. at *5 (citing United States v. Hernandez-Mandujano, 721 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 2013), 
which held that suppression of evidence is not available regarding questions of identity). 
255 See Hernandez-Mandujano, 721 F.3d at 354–56 (noting the lack of suppression for 
evidence which identifies a suspect). 
256 See id. (showing the lack of suppression of identifying statements). 
257 See id. (stating that the suppression of identifying statements is not available to an illegal 
alien whom is not afforded full constitutional protections). 
258 See The Constitutional Right to Silence, supra note 60 (illustrating that the Fifth 
Amendment exists as constitutional protections in the form of a bundle of rights which 
includes the right to remain silent and the right to stop questioning). 
259 See supra notes 235–48 and accompanying text (discussing suppression of evidence and 
constitutional protections in various scenarios where illegal immigrants were questioned 
about identity statements such as their identity and immigration statuses). 
260 See Anil Kalhan, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Implications of Interior Immigration 
Enforcement, 41 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 1137, 1142–43 (2008) (detailing the Fourth Amendment 
and privacy as potential grounds for the suppression of evidence regarding identity). 
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and brought the border to everywhere inside the United States.261  A less 
obvious consequence to interior enforcement is how immigration status—
an often invisible and previously irrelevant trait—reaches the public with 
increased relevancy.262  Professor Kalhan described this erosion of privacy 
norms using Fourth Amendment law, and sadly concluded that the courts 
were unlikely to extend constitutional protections to people who wished 
to keep their immigration status private.263  This decrease in privacy 
protections is a central reason why silence in the face of inquiries on 
immigration status is inadequate to protect against deportation.264  While 
Professor Kalhan does an excellent job explaining the legal doctrines that 
courts use when refusing to extend constitutional privacy to immigration 
status, he does not describe why courts have been quick to characterize 
inquiries on immigration status as insignificant intrusions not worthy of 
triggering the Fourth Amendment.265  This section argues that one key 
component to the diminished privacy expectation for immigrants, and 
therefore limited constitutional protection, lies with the evolution of how 
citizenship is treated by the American public.266  Immigration status only 
exists in the shadows of citizenship, as the purpose and meaning of 
citizenship has evolved, the protection of one’s interest in revealing 
immigration status has also changed.267  By using several initiatives to 
expand interior immigration enforcement, such as instituting IRCA’s 
worker provisions,268 funding programs in county jails, and deputizing 
                                                
261 See id. at 1149 (“As . . . immigration have increased and become more geographically 
dispersed in recent years . . . many more individuals within the interior of the county have 
become potential targets of immigration enforcement than traditionally has been the case.” 
(citations omitted)). 
262 See id. at 1217–18 (noting the increased dispersion of immigrants and increased 
enforcement of deportation rules by the government). 
263 See id. at 1206 (positing one reason for increased enforcement, and thus greater public 
exposure to immigration issues, is that “courts will deem government officials entirely 
unconstrained by the Fourth Amendment”).   
264 See id. (explaining the importance of privacy considerations, which are degraded when 
courts do not enforce the exclusionary clause in regard to interrogations about identity). 
265 See id. at 1206–09 (lacking a discussion in regard to why courts have failed to note that 
unwanted interrogations do not give way to a Fourth Amendment right against intrusions 
of privacy). 
266 See infra notes 272–77 and accompanying text (discussing the developments in social 
perceptions regarding immigration status, and noting that modern notions of privacy 
suggest that a person should have great freedom to avoid unwanted interrogations 
regardless of immigration status). 
267 See infra notes 272–77 and accompanying text (noting a shift in public perception of 
immigration status which is more sympathetic to the plight of immigrants facing intrusions 
of privacy in the form of unwanted interrogations).   
268 See The Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3445 (1986) 
[hereinafter IRCA] (enacting and defining protections for immigrant in the modern 
American workforce). 
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local law enforcement, the federal government not only made 
immigration status more public, but also transformed the importance of 
U.S. citizenship for one’s civil and political rights.269  As immigration 
status and citizenship became more public, one’s citizenship status has 
become a source of identity.270  Once citizenship and immigration status 
becomes a part of one’s legal identity, courts become less willing to view 
privacy interests in keeping those traits anonymous and worthy of 
protection.271 
The meaning and substance of U.S. citizenship has been a subject of 
discourse and debate for many years, especially in the context of the rights 
of aliens and the immigration system.272  In 1973, Alexander Bickel wrote 
that citizenship “was not important,”273 and did so because he distrusted 
that rights should be dependent on a legal construct such as citizenship as 
“[i]t always will be easier, to think of someone as a noncitizen than to 
decide that he is a nonperson . . . .”274  While recognizing that citizenship 
is of prime importance at the border, he dismissed the notion that it held 
much relevance in the interior.275  Bickel celebrated how constitutional 
protections were for the most part based on personhood rather than 
citizenship.276 
If citizenship is not tied to rights, then what purpose does it serve and 
does it have meaning separate from the border?277  Professor Bosniak 
examined the different and varying views of the meaning of citizenship.278  
She described theories on citizenship as membership, a bundle of rights, 
                                                
269 See infra notes 272–77 and accompanying text (expounding on the importance of public 
perceptions regarding status). 
270 See infra notes 272–77 and accompanying text (illustrating the growing importance of a 
person’s immigration status as a part of a person’s social identity). 
271 See infra notes 272–77 and accompanying text (highlighting the shift in public 
perception of immigration status). 
272 See LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN:  DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY 
MEMBERSHIP 77 (Princeton University Press 2006) (highlighting the various strategies used 
by legal scholars to reorient the constitutional rights discussion surrounding the idea of 
citizenship).  
273 See Alexander M. Bickel, Citizenship in the American Constitution, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 369, 
370 (1973) (explaining his view on why citizenship is unimportant in the context of rights an 
illegal alien may receive). 
274 Id. at 387. 
275 See id. at 382 (suggesting that perceptions that immigrants are only concerned about 
immigration to the extent that immigration status imposes duties and burdens in terms of 
entering America). 
276 See id. at 370 (stating that the Preamble of the Constitution uses the language “We the 
People” not “We the Citizens”). 
277 See BOSNIAK, supra note 272, at 17 (raising the question of whether citizenship has 
meaning outside the context of the border). 
278 Id. 
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and identity.279  The enhancement of immigration interior enforcement 
drives more forcefully the notion of citizenship as a bundle of rights—as 
not only a membership in a nation, but also as an exclusive status that 
allows for full civic engagement—from travel, to driving, to work, and 
finally to freedom from exile.280  However, as citizenship grows in its 
importance in terms of the rights that it confers, it also increases the role 
of citizenship as identity.281  If one’s status as a citizen confers specific 
benefits, then one’s identity becomes more intertwined with citizenship—
not just for interactions between an individual and the government, but 
also between individuals.282  Rights that are exclusively held by citizens 
are quite thin in the constitutional context.283  While some courts have 
pushed back on the idea that citizenship is unimportant in deciding 
constitutional protections,284 for the most part, scholars and jurists agree 
with Bickel and recognize that for Constitutional rights, personhood rather 
than citizenship is the defining trait.285  However, while constitutional 
protections286 remain ignorant of citizenship, this does not mean that other 
rights and benefits are as agnostic.287 
                                                
279 See id. at 18–20 (identifying the three theories in which Professor Bosniak believes 
citizenship is defined). 
280 See id. at 20 (explaining what is included in the bundle of rights, and what comes with 
such rights).  
281 See id. (showing that citizenship as identity comes about as a result of a person receiving 
various rights). 
282 See id. at 20–21 (expanding on the theory of citizenship as identity). 
283 See R. Linus Chan, The Right to Travel:  Breaking Down the Thousand Petty Fortresses of 
State Self-Deportation Laws, 34 PACE L. REV. 814, 868–73 (2014) (showing that although these 
people may reside in the country, because of their immigration status, they do not have many 
constitutional rights). 
284 See, e.g., United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974, 983 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding the 
prohibition of firearms on those in the United States illegally or unlawfully did not violate 
alien’s Second Amendment Rights); United States v. Verdugo-Uriquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 275 
(1990) (classifying rights by how much of a connection a person had to the United States).  
See also David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens:  The Real 
Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP.CT. REV. 47, 137 (2001) (highlighting the need for a 
continued effort on expanding the rights of aliens in the United States).  
285 See Linda Bosniak, Persons and Citizens in Constitutional Thought, INT’L J. CONST. L. (Jan. 
1, 2010), https://academic.oup.com/icon/article/8/1/9/682631/Persons-and-citizens-in-
constitutional-thought [https://perma.cc/YF7R-HMQD] (stating the view amongst most 
leading scholars that personhood is the defining characteristic in debates surrounding 
citizenship). 
286 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI (showing the enumerated rights granted to United 
States citizens); id. amend. XIV, § 2, cl. 1 (depicting the privileges that citizens of the United 
States receive). 
287 See Ilona Bray, Legal Rights of Undocumented Immigrants, LAWYERS.COM, (Oct. 3, 2017) 
https://immigration.lawyers.com/general-immigration/legal-rights-of-illegal-immigrants. 
html [https://perma.cc/T9BC-T6MJ] (establishing the legal rights that illegal immigrants 
currently have under the laws of the United States). 
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A difficulty with examining civil and political rights of non-citizens is 
determining what level of differing treatment qualifies as an impingement 
of one’s rights versus deciding if differing treatment merely impinges on 
potential “benefits” that may be properly restricted to citizens.288  For 
instance, while not all citizens are given the right to vote, at least in the 
modern Post-Reconstruction period, non-citizens are universally denied 
the right to vote in federal elections.289 
Various scholars290 note the focus on interior enforcement forces the 
federal government to recruit state and local actors.291  As part of this 
recruitment, states and localities began the process of sorting between U.S. 
citizens and those with immigration status in deciding qualifications for 
various benefits.292  For instance, many states began to specifically restrict 
driver’s licenses to people with a specific status in the United States—
some states do this explicitly, while others do so indirectly by requiring 
certain forms of identification (i.e., social security numbers).293  The role of 
REAL ID294 cannot be understated in fostering states’ adoption of 
citizenship and authorized immigration status requirements before 
conferring driver’s licenses.295  Moreover, some state laws that sought to 
discriminate against those without status by restricting their ability to rent 
apartments or make binding contracts were struck down (often under pre-
emption rather than based on a rights theory).296  Yet, in Fremont, 
                                                
288 See Rubrick Beigon et al., Study Guide, THE RIGHTS OF NON-CITIZENS (2003), 
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/edumat/studyguides/noncitizens.html [https://perma.cc/ 
Y5WS-2PL2] (determining the rights afforded to illegal immigrants in the United States). 
289 See Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens:  The Historical, Constitutional and 
Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1469 (1993) (conveying the 
history of voting rights given to illegal immigrants in the United States).  
290 See Kalhan, supra note 260, at 1139 (detailing Kalhan’s view on how interior enforcement 
affects the government’s ability to recruit state and local actors).  See also Ingrid V. Eagly, 
Criminal Justice for Noncitizens:  An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1126, 1156 (2013) (analyzing the variation in enforcement amongst federal agencies). 
291 See id. at 1156 (explaining the ability of the government to recruit states and localities to 
implement tougher enforcement of their immigration laws). 
292 See id. at 1173 (describing the process by which state actors take away rights from non-
citizens in the United States). 
293 See Lindsey R. Wheeler, Driving Privilege Cards for Undocumented Minnesotans:  
Addressing Constitutional Concerns and Promoting Public Safety, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 64, 
112–15 (2014) (stating that some states have explicitly passed legislation to allow driver’s 
licenses to undocumented immigrants). 
294 See The Real ID Act, Pub. L. 109–13, 119 Stat. 231, 302 (2005) (changing the process of 
issuance procedures and standards by which one receives their driver’s license and other 
identity documents). 
295 See id. (explaining how the Real ID Act forces states to define citizenship before issuing 
driver’s licenses). 
296 See Michael Seng, Renting to Immigrants: The Laws Affecting Landlords and Undocumented 
Immigrants, EZ LANDLORDS FORMS (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.ezlandlordforms.com/ 
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Nebraska, efforts were upheld even after Arizona v. United States.297  
However, the rights versus benefits distinction breaks down quickly when 
considering that several core “rights” are considered properly impinged 
upon based on citizenship status, such as the right to work and make a 
living, and the right to equal treatment.298  While allowing disparate 
treatment between citizens and non-citizens does not create exclusive 
constitutional rights reserved for citizens,299 it nevertheless creates benefits 
that are reserved for citizens, even if temporary and at the whim of the 
legislature—federal, state or local.300  For instance, while the ability to 
work may not be an exclusive constitutional civil right, it can become an 
exclusive benefit for citizens and certain groups of authorized citizens 
with the authorization of Congress.301  These changes make citizenship 
and immigration status much more important and consequently much 
more public.302  The creation of more eligibility requirements for 
benefits—state, federal or local, that focus on citizenship or possession of 
certain documentation—drives the citizenship and immigration status 
                                                
articles/educational/3/45/renting-to-immigrants-the-laws-affecting-landlords-and-
undocumented-immigrants/ [https://perma.cc/8TUK-HQHH] (outlining the laws 
affecting the housing of undocumented immigrants in America); The Law Against Hiring or 
Harboring Illegal Immigration, FEDERATION FOR AMERICAN IMMIGRATION REFORM (Dec. 1999), 
https://fairus.org/issue/illegal-immigration/law-against-hiring-or-harboring-illegal-
aliens [https://perma.cc/X2JJ-2ZW2] (describing the purposes of the federal law related to 
harboring illegal aliens and the law’s effects). 
297 See Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmer’s Branch, 726 F.3d 524, 539 (5th Cir. 
2013) (holding that the criminal offense and penalty provisions of the city statute, along with 
the state judicial review process, conflicted with federal immigration law).  See also Keller v. 
City of Freemont, 719 F.3d 931, 951 (8th Cir. 2013) (stating that the city’s ordinance rental 
provisions were not in conflict with or field-preempted by federal law); United States v. 
Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1301 (11th Cir. 2012) (determining that federal law occupied the area 
of illegal alien registration and therefore preempted the provision of the Act criminalizing 
unlawfully present alien’s willful failure to complete or carry federally required registration 
documents). 
298 See IRCA, supra note 268, at 3359 (making the hiring of illegal immigrants illegal and 
required employers to obtain immigration status).  See also Cortezano v. Salin Bank & Trust 
Co., 680 F.3d 936, 940–41 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that terminating employment based on 
marriage to an undocumented individual was permissible). 
299 See Chan, supra note 283, at 870 (highlighting the distinction between citizen and non-
citizen and that natural citizens do not have exclusive access to constitutional rights). 
300 See Ann Morse, Chart of Immigrant Eligibility for Federal Programs, NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
immigration/immigrant-eligibility-for-federal-programs.aspx [https://perma.cc/4VZW-
8HB6] (explaining the benefits that legal immigrants are afforded by the government). 
301 See IRCA, supra note 268, at 3395 (identifying the rationale and substance behind the 
law). 
302 See Frank Newport, American Public Opinion and Immigration, GALLUP NEWS (July 20, 
2015), http://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/184262/american-public-
opinion-immigration.aspx [http://perma.cc/25LE-WLAG] (defining how citizenship makes 
the subject of immigration and citizenship available for public debate). 
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more into the public sphere.303  Every time a citizen checks off an I-9 form 
to indicate their ability to work, they are making their citizenship status 
quasi-public.304  The same applies to lawful permanent residents and visa 
holders with the ability to work when they fill out I-9s.305 
While there are not many benefits that are reserved for non-citizens, 
some procedures are in place to try to protect non-citizen rights.306  For 
instance, Federal Criminal Procedure requires notifications to non-citizens 
of the potential consequences of a guilty plea and this requirement is 
mirrored in various states.307  This requirement is ostensibly to protect a 
person’s due process right when deciding whether to make an intelligent, 
knowing, and voluntary plea.308  The Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla 
v. Kentucky309 also “creates” a right for non-citizens to have adequate 
advice about immigration consequences explained to them as part of the 
requirement in receiving adequate assistance of counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment.310  The Vienna Convention also confers on foreign nationals 
the “right” to access their consulates after a criminal arrest, in some cases 
this right requires mandatory notification to the consulates themselves.311  
These various rights or benefits are conferred exclusively to non-
                                                
303 See id. (showing how one’s possession of certain documents brings their immigration 
status out into the public sphere). 
304 See Christine Samsel & Hannah Caplan, New Form I-9 Means More Immigration Related 
Change in 2017, LAW 360 (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/864973/new-
form-i-9-means-more-immigration-related-change-in-2017 [https://perma.cc/YJN8-BY8W] 
(discussing how the changes to the I-9 form will affect illegal and legal immigrants). 
305 See I-9 Employment Authorization Requirements, U. OF MINN. OFF. OF HUM. RESOURCES 
(Sept. 22, 2017), https://humanresources.umn.edu/payroll-administration/i9-
employment-authorization-requirements#anchor-6 [https://perma.cc/5E9M-7VQE] 
(setting forth the requirements an I-9 visa holder must undertake to gain employment). 
306 See Raoul Lowery Contreras, Yes, Illegal Aliens Have Constitutional Rights, HILL (Sept. 29, 
2015), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/immigration/255281-yes-illegal-aliens-
have-constitutional-rights [https://perma.cc/L2QM-E2ZR] (detailing the constitutional 
rights given to non-citizens in the United States). 
307 See FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 11 (providing the rules of procedure related helping non-citizens). 
308 See id. (detailing the federal rule of procedure related to plea agreements and a 
defendant’s rights in such cases). 
309 559 U.S. 356, 388 (2010) (holding that defendant’s counsel participated in deficient 
performance by failing to advise his client that his guilty plea made him subject to automatic 
deportation). 
310 See CONST. amend. VI Jury Trials (giving the defendant the right to a speedy and 
impartial trial by jury, if they so choose). 
311 See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, U.N. (Apr. 
24, 1963), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/17843.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
45YA-4JJB] (examining the rules and regulations surrounding foreign nationals upon their 
arrest in the United States). 
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citizens.312  Again by making the distinction between citizens and non-
citizens relevant—even if the purpose was to protect non-citizen 
interests—the question of whether a person is a citizen or not requires 
identifying non-citizens from citizens.313  Professor Kalhan realizes this 
shift by explaining how under Katz314 case law, the notion of sharing 
information diminishes one’s privacy rights and therefore protection.315  
But while important, a factor is missing.316  As do many other privacy 
scholars, Professor Kalhan properly critiques the “third party” sharing 
doctrine317 as divorced from the reality of how people protect their private 
information.318  For instance, while people may readily give up their 
family genealogy to Ancestry.com, it does not follow that they would 
openly share the same information to law enforcement.319  The purpose of 
information requests plays a critical role in deciding whether someone 
may want to keep something private.320  A loan officer asking information 
about one’s finances will not meet much resistance.321  However, any 
                                                
312 See John Quigley, If You are Not a United States Citizen. . . :  International Requirements in 
the Arrest of Foreigners, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 661 (2009) (presuming the consular notification 
requirement could apply to someone with dual citizenship in the United States). 
313 See Hans von Spakovsky, The Threat of Non-Citizen Voting, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (July 
10, 2008), http://www.heritage.org/report/the-threat-non-citizen-voting 
[https://perma.cc/3GWH-6FLP] (identifying the reasons for the distinction between 
citizens and non-citizens). 
314 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (asserting that a telephone booth 
is a place where privacy is expected, that physical and electronic intrusion into a private 
place may violate the Fourth Amendment, and that the invasion, by federal authorities, of 
an area protected by the Constitution is unreasonable without a search warrant).  
315 See Kalhan, supra note 260, at 1146 (scrutinizing the Supreme Court’s treatment of any 
disclosure to a third-party as abandoning privacy interests in that information). 
316 Compare Kalhan, supra note 260, at 1146 (reprimanding the Supreme Court’s treatment 
of any disclosure to a third-party as abandoning privacy interests in that information) with 
infra note 350 (noting that identity is closely tied to group membership).  
317 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
318 See Kalhan, supra note 260, at 1171 (chastising the Court’s all-or-nothing approach to 
privacy expectation). 
319 See Richard Tutton, “They Want to Know Where They Came From”:  Population Genetics, 
Identity, and Family Genealogy, 28 NEW GENETICS & SOC’Y 105, 114–15 (2004) (considering 
Erick Schonfeld’s concern about law enforcement’s ability to access his genetic material if he 
were to submit to genetic testing by a private company in the business of researching family 
genealogy). 
320 See Lee Rainie & Maeve Duggan, Privacy and Information Sharing, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 14, 
2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/01/14/privacy-and-information-sharing/ 
[http://perma.cc/92N2-CKAW] (finding that Americans are generally willing to share 
information if they will receive a tangible benefit but are often cautious about sharing 
information in other circumstances). 
321 See What Information Do I Have to Provide a Lender in Order to Receive a Loan Estimate?, 
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU (Mar. 3, 2017), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-information-do-i-have-to-provide-a-
lender-in-order-to-receive-a-loan-estimate-en-1987/ [http://perma.cc/HZ6N-6NSH] 
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encounter with law enforcement is likely to make one wary of giving up 
information.322  And yet, people do not stay silent with the police or 
immigration officials when it comes to their immigration status or 
citizenship.323  Why?  People must know that sharing such information 
directly to law enforcement could lead to arrest or deportation.324  While 
there must be some level of fear and perhaps coercion in many of these 
encounters, it is likely that people feel an obligation to give up this 
information.325  People give up their immigration status and citizenship 
for the same reason they tell law enforcement their names, it is intertwined 
with their sense of identity.326 
Identity as a social construct usually begins with forging a 
membership into a larger community.327  At the same time, identity is also 
a means of constructing a way to differentiate ourselves from other 
people.328  Identity has a paradoxical function of sorting and unifying 
groups of people.329  For instance, when used in the law enforcement 
context such as in Hiibel, “identity,” such as one’s name, is used to sort 
someone from the larger public.330  At the same time, one’s own identity 
can be derived from a variety of different traits:  place of birth, family 
                                                
(explaining that information on loan estimates is likely to be more accurate if one divulges 
more financial information to a loan officer). 
322 See Harry Cheadle, A Law Professor Explains Why You Should Never Talk to Police, VICE 
(Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/mvkgnp/law-professor-police-
interrogation-law-constitution-survival [http://perma.cc/X5T3-YC78] (explaining that 
giving the police any information may be dangerous). 
323 See Know Your Rights When Dealing With Law Enforcement, MONT. IMMIGR. JUST. 
ALLIANCE, http://www.mija.org/immigration-facts/know-your-rights-when-dealing-with 
-law-enforcement/ [http://perma.cc/9AZY-XGD9] (embracing the idea that many 
immigrants willingly divulge their status to police officers). 
324 See id. (asserting that if an immigrant divulges their immigration status to a police 
officer that the officer will most likely refer the immigrant for deportation proceedings).  
325 See Kalhan, supra note 260, at 1173 (clarifying that an immigrant will sometimes reveal 
their status to a border control agent or a federal officer to inquire about entrance into the 
United States or another country or about obtaining federal benefits). 
326 See id. at 1140 (considering immigration status as a part of public identity). 
327 See Gregory S. Parks et al., Complex Civil Rights Organizations:  Alpha Kappa Alpha 
Sorority, an Exemplar, 6 ALA. CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 125, 157 (2014) (explaining that identity is 
tied closely with group membership). 
328 See Richard Ned Lebow, Ethics and Interests, 96 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. PROC. 75, 82 (2002) 
(establishing identity as a way to differentiate oneself from another).  
329 See CAROLE HOUGH, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF NAMES AND NAMING § 26.2.1 (2016) 
(describing how people identify themselves based on their similarities and differences from 
others). 
330 See Cristina M. Sorrentino, Individuation, Identity and Proper Names in Cognitive 
Development (Oct. 2, 1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology) (highlighting the theory that an individual’s name designates them as separate 
from another individual).  See also Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 
180 (focusing on Hiibel’s conviction for refusing to identify himself during a stop). 
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name, occupation and, of course, one’s nationality.331  In that sense, it is 
not odd or new that people have treated their citizenship as a sort of 
identity.332  This is particularly true when traveling outside of one’s home 
country; one’s nationality and citizenship plays important roles in giving 
people a sense of security and belonging.333  However, until the rise of 
interior immigration enforcement mechanisms, actual citizenship was not 
considered particularly important as a means to group or differentiate 
people inside one’s own country.334  In a nation where citizenship and 
immigration status do not confer much in the way of benefits or rights, 
grouping together as citizens of one’s home country makes little to no 
sense.335  However, as soon as one’s citizenship status, and consequently 
immigration status, does become relevant to employment, school tuition, 
health insurance, mortgages, occupational licensing, and driving, the 
groupings begin to make sense.336  What starts out as a means to establish 
eligibility for a bundle of rights and benefits becomes much more, 
culturally.337  If citizenship confers upon a person the highest level of 
protections and benefits inside one’s home country and people reside in 
that country without citizenship, citizenship becomes more than eligibility 
and becomes identity.338 
                                                
331 See Merril Keane, China’s National Resident Identity Card:  Identity and Population 
Management in Transition, 23 UCLA PACIFIC BASIN L.J. 212, 222–23 (2006) (identifying place 
of birth, name, occupation, and ethnicity as identifying information requested in a 
Permanent Resident Registration Form).   
332 See Ernesto Hernandez-Lopez, Global Migrations and Imagined Citizenship:  Examples From 
Slavery, Chinese Exclusion, and When Questioning Birthright Citizenship, 14 TEX. WESLEYAN L. 
REV. 255, 256 (interpreting citizenship as an example of national identity). 
333 See Javier Perez, Note, Reasonably Suspicious of Being Mojado:  The Legal Derogation of 
Latinos in Immigration Enforcement, 17 TEX. HISP. J OF L. & POL’Y 99, 107 (noting that citizenship 
gives on a sense of security and belonging). 
334 See Kalhan, supra note 260, at 1149 (observing that since new measures have been 
adopted to expand interior immigration enforcement, there has been more targeting of 
people within the United States than there traditionally has been). 
335 See id. at 1141 (outlining that there are very few differences between the rights of a 
citizen and a non-citizen in the United States so dividing the groups based on status is 
irrelevant). 
336 See id. at 1140 (pointing out that in some social contexts citizenship status becomes very 
important). 
337 See James Grossman, Citizenship, History, and Public Culture, AM. HISTORY ASS’N (2017), 
https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/ 
january-2011/citizenship-history-and-public-culture [http://perma.cc/26WF-KMWR] 
(recognizing the importance of citizenship to millions of Americans). 
338 See Kalhan, supra note 260, at 1140 (reflecting on the rights and benefits conferred onto 
citizens, but not non-citizens, such as permission to enter the country and the right to vote) 
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At the other end of the spectrum, those with the lowest eligibility for 
protections and benefits turn to grouping for comfort and protection.339  
This mirrors the phenomenon of the rise of “DREAMers,” or young 
undocumented youth brought to the United States as children, but also 
neatly fits more and more undocumented people in the United States 
creating an identity.340  Professor Rose Cuison Villazor describes the 
phenomenon of “coming out of the closet” of being undocumented and 
no longer trying to hide one’s undocumented status.341  What has become 
interesting about this phenomenon is the separation of citizenship from 
the phrase “American.”342  Jose Antonio Vargas, a Pulitzer Prize winning 
journalist, “came out” as undocumented and founded an organization 
called “Define American.”343  Shortly thereafter, Time Magazine featured a 
picture of a group of undocumented immigrants with the emblazoned 
title, “We are Americans*” and then under that phrase, “Just not legally” 
on its cover.344  It is therefore not surprising that one’s citizenship and 
immigration status, as it becomes more drawn into one’s identity, 
becomes less private, and therefore less likely something to be silent upon 
when asked by law enforcement.345 
What might go unappreciated, however, is that the more we are 
forced to group ourselves based on citizenship and immigration status the 
more we are, again, bringing the border inside the country.346  As it 
becomes more accepted that one’s citizenship and immigration status are 
markers for identity, it also becomes more difficult to claim they are a 
privacy right, and to keep silent about them.347  The Fifth Circuit’s348 
                                                
339 See Emma Seppala, How the Stress of Disaster Brings People Together, SCIENTIFIC AM. 
(2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-the-stress-of-disaster-brings-
people-together/ [http://perma.cc/3Y2K-ABJ3] (relying on a study that suggests that when 
a person is vulnerable they are more likely to seek out the comfort of others). 
340 See Rose Cuison Villazor, The Undocumented Closet, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1, 60 (2013) 
(underlining “undocumented” as an identity). 
341 See id. at 5 (examining how undocumented citizens have borrowed certain tropes from 
the LGBTQ community to expose their undocumented status). 
342 See id. at 60 (urging that undocumented immigrants identify as both American and 
undocumented). 
343 See Our Team, DEFINE AMERICAN, https://defineamerican.com/about/our-team/ 
[http://perma.cc/SFG2-ZGNW] (presenting Jose Antonio Vargas as the CEO of Define 
America and explaining that he has revealed his undocumented status). 
344 See TIME, June 25, 2012 (illustrating the undocumented immigrants on the magazine 
cover).  
345 See Villazor, supra note 340, at 60 (endorsing the idea that citizenship is a form of 
identity). 
346 See Kalhan, supra note 260, at 1142 (analyzing how the elimination of areas in which 
citizenship is irrelevant creates an omnipresent border). 
347 See Villazor, supra note 340, at 60 (applying citizenship as a form of identity). 
348 Along with the Third and Sixth circuits. 
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interpretation of INS v. Lopez-Mendoza that led to the holding that no 
evidence about one’s identity can be suppressed becomes even more 
dangerous.349  The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. Hernandez-
Mandujano to equate one’s status as an illegal entrant to that of identity 
may at first glance appear strange, but becomes understandable once you 
accept citizenship and therefore immigration status as identity.350  The 
court in Palacios was able to prevent the suppression of clearly inculpatory 
evidence by reframing one’s status not as evidence of wrongdoing but 
rather as an identifier—on par with one’s name.351  One reason why 
Arizona’s SB 1070 law was decried as the “Papers, please” Act was that it 
portended a situation depicted in Nazi Germany where one is forced to 
outwardly identify one’s citizenship and identity for purposes of law 
enforcement.352  The more the American public allows citizenship and 
immigration status to become markers of eligibility for certain benefits 
and rights, the more we further allow citizenship and immigration status 
to be used by law enforcement for identification.353 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
On July 21, 2017, a San Diego school teacher by the name of Shane 
Parmely was driving with her family in New Mexico when she came 
across a check point run by CBP.  The border patrol agent asked Ms. 
Parmely, a middle school teacher, whether she was a U.S. citizen or not, 
but Ms. Parmely refused to answer.  She believed she was within her 
rights to refuse to answer the question and continued to refuse to answer 
even after she was told that the law supported such a checkpoint and 
questions.  When the agent did not get an answer, the Border Patrol 
detained the family for about an hour but eventually released Ms. Parmely 
without requiring an answer. The Border Patrol was correct when it 
explained that such checkpoints had previously passed constitutional 
                                                
349 See 175 F.3d 345, 346 (1999) (construing the Supreme Court’s decision in Lopez-Mendoza 
to hold that identity is not suppressible). 
350 See 721 F.3d 345, 355 (2013) (clarifying that some evidence is so intertwined with identity 
that the evidence becomes identity and is therefore not suppressible). 
351 See United States v. Palacios, No. H-17-221-01, 2017 WL 2378942, at *5 (considering 
evidence of identity as insuppressible). 
352 See Jennifer M. Chacon, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 WM. & MARY 
BILL OF RTS. J. 577, 578 (2012) (discussing how Cardinal Mahoney compared the provisions 
of Arizona SB 1070 law to Nazism and how Rachel Maddow branded the law the “papers, 
please” law for similar reasons).  See also John C. Eastman, Papers, Please:  Does the Constitution 
Permit the States A Role in Immigration Enforcement?, 35 HARV. J. OF L. & PUB. POL'Y 569, 570 
(2012) (finding that states are acting reasonably to protect their residents without 
overstepping plenary power). 
353 See Kalhan, supra note 260, at 1140 (establishing that citizenship is important when 
considering one’s entitlement to certain rights and benefits). 
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muster.  The U.S. Supreme Court in 1976 examined similar checkpoints 
and had ruled them constitutional354 under the Fourth Amendment.  What 
is not quite clear is what would have happened if Ms. Parmely continued 
to refuse to answer the question and border patrol decided to continue to 
hold her in detention.  When the check point turns the detention from a 
brief one into a prolonged one, what role does the right to silence play in 
deciding the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness of detention?  As 
explained above, doctrinally, the issue is likely to be resolved in the border 
patrol’s favor, but what becomes trickier, practically, is if border patrol 
was forced to detain large numbers of white U.S. citizens who simply 
refused to answer the question.  It would seem difficult to imagine a 
scenario where CBP could justify a policy where it would detain people 
without any reason to suspect illegal entry other than a refusal to answer 
the question about their citizenship.  Citizens, especially ones who are 
white and therefore not of “Mexican ancestry,” as discussed by the Court 
in Martinez-Fuerte, are the people that pose the most problematic scenario 
for law enforcement in their sorting paradigm.  If they resist sorting, at 
least by law enforcement, then one’s right to silence about one’s 
citizenship and immigration status can play a role in preventing 
deportation that arises from the wholesale waiver of an important 
constitutional right.  
                                                
354 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976) (holding that checkpoint 
stops in which people are stopped for questioning when there is no reason to believe illegal 
immigrants are in the vehicle). 
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